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Abstract 
Mind wandering (MW) is a heterogeneous and private phenomenon, which is nonetheless 
omnipresent in people’s lives. Research on this phenomenon has grown considerably during 
the past decade, thanks also to the development of neuroimaging techniques which have given 
us a window into the brain’s activity while we are lost in our thoughts. However, there are 
still two important issues for researchers in this field. The first, is the need to evoke in an 
experimental setting what is, by definition, a spontaneous phenomenon. This can be solved by 
developing an experimental task that creates certain conditions in which MW is more or less 
likely to arise. The second issue is the reliance on individuals’ self-reports, which are 
inherently subjective, to understand the emergence, and content, of MW. This issue is harder 
to tackle, but one possibility is to develop a physiological, objective marker of MW. Recently, 
two candidates have emerged as potential markers of MW: one is the default mode network 
(DMN), a set of brain areas that show coordinated activity when people drift off to their inner 
thoughts; the second candidate is baseline pupil size, which has showed sensitivity to changes 
in external and internal attention, such as during episodes of MW. This thesis describes the 
development of a novel paradigm for the study of mind wandering, and its use to understand 
the potential that the DMN and baseline pupil size have as markers of this phenomenon. In 
three empirical studies, this paradigm successfully modulates individuals’ performance, MW, 
and on-task focus. Further, evidence from these studies indicates that DMN activity and 
baseline pupil size don’t provide sufficient precision to be used in isolation as markers of 
MW: in particular, it is suggested that their predictive power strongly depends on taking into 
account the content of the MW experience, and the context in which it occurs.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Human cognition has the tendency to seamlessly switch its focus between the external 
environment and its inner, self-generated thoughts. One phenomenon that captures this unique 
aspect is mind wandering (MW), in which attention flows from an ongoing task to unrelated 
thoughts (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015), such as finding ourselves thinking about what 
to cook for dinner while driving home from work. Mind wandering is a very common 
experience; studies estimate that individuals spend a quarter to half of their waking lives 
engaged in MW (Kane et al., 2007; Klinger & Cox, 1987; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). In 
spite of the ubiquitous nature of MW in our conscious lives, this phenomenon was neglected 
in psychological research for a long time, for a handful of reasons, the chief of which being 
the general skepticism towards internal experience and introspection inherited from the 
behaviourist era (Callard, Smallwood, & Margulies, 2012; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in the study of internal experiences 
from both fields of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience; this is in large part due to the 
fast development of new methodologies, allowing researchers to acquire neurocognitive 
measures and not solely rely on self-reports and behavioural measures like in the past. Figure 
1.1 shows the number of papers published on the subject of mind wandering in the past 
century. The same phenomenon, i.e. attention diverging from an external task to internal 
thoughts, has received several different scientific terms throughout the years: “daydreaming”, 
“mind wandering”, “stimulus-independent thought”, “task-unrelated thought” are some of the 
main terms used in the literature. From the figure it is possible to see research in the 
daydreaming phenomenon starting in the mid 1960’s with the seminal work of Antrobus, 
Singer, & Greenberg, (1966), and subsequently the spike in interest in MW research in the 
past decade, together with this latter term’s  general acceptance in the scientific community, 
which in turn can be retraced to Smallwood & Schooler 2006’s article “The Restless Mind”.  
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Figure 1.1 - The number of papers for the different keywords in each year was calculated through a bibliography 
search using the software Publish or Perish (Harzing, 2007). The rapid growth in interest in the topic starts around 
2006. 
 
Despite these advances, mind wandering research still largely relies on self-reports, and does 
not have a standard experimental paradigm used for its study. The research presented in this 
thesis aimed to build on the literature in order to find a solution to these two problems: 
developing an experimental paradigm for the study of MW, and investigating the neural and 
pupillary correlates of this phenomenon, to understand their potential as objective markers. 
While the field of mind wandering research is young relative to other psychological topics, 
there already are a number of findings that have been reproduced by different research groups 
and are thus widely accepted in the community. Mind wandering is known to be a frequent 
and permeating phenomenon in individuals’ waking lives; it is more often than not oriented 
towards future thoughts, although past-oriented MW has been linked to negative mood 
effects; it arises more commonly whenever the individual is engaged in an easy, well-
practiced task; however, if MW does arise during a demanding task, it often leads to costs in 
performance; the content of an individual’s mind wandering is not trivial in determining the 
benefits or costs that it will produce; finally, states of MW have been paired to a number of 
neural correlates, using fMRI, pupillometry, and electroencephalography (EEG). 
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1.1 Mind Wandering Is a Frequent and Ubiquitous Phenomenon 
It is a common experience to find oneself mind wandering multiple times every day; at least 
six studies tried to estimate exactly how often this happens, using real-life paradigms 
(Michael J Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987; McVay, 
Kane, & Kwapil, 2009; Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; Song & Wang, 2012). All studies 
used slight variations of experience sampling (ES; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & 
Stone, 2004) methodology, which involves probing participants at different moments of the 
day using a beeper or a phone app, and asking them a series of questions regarding the 
occurrence, and quality, of the thoughts they were having just before they were prompted 
(probe-caught ES). Klinger & Cox (1987), Kane et al. (2007), McVay et al., (2009), and 
Poerio et al., (2013) all found that for ~30% of the samples, participants reported experiences 
of MW just before being probed; Killingsworth & Gilbert (2010) found that number to be 
slightly higher, with their participants reporting MW on ~47% of the thought samples; Song 
& Wang (2012), who conducted their study in China, found a MW rate of ~24%. 
Interestingly, all studies showed a wide inter-individual range in MW rates, ranging from < 
10% to > 90%. In brief, both everyday experience and real-world studies point to MW being a 
very common mental phenomenon, with individuals being decoupled from the external 
environment for large parts of their waking lives. 
  
1.2 Mind Wandering Has Both Costs and Benefits 
The fact that human minds wander this frequently suggests that there could be benefits to the 
otherwise potentially dangerous state of being decoupled from the external environment. 
Already in the mid ‘60s, Antrobus et al. (1966) noted: “The presence of this non-perceptual 
cognitive activity on such a large scale is perhaps the strongest argument that daydreaming 
and imagining serve a useful purpose for the individual”. At the same time, if the mind 
wanders towards one’s inner thoughts whenever the external environment demands attention, 
it can come at a cost. Two lines of research have been researching how the context and the 
content of mind wandering episodes relate to its potential costs and benefits. 
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1.2.1 Benefits of Mind Wandering 
One of the most consistent findings in the field is that individuals engaged in mind wandering 
tend to think more about future than past events. This has been found in a range of different 
MW paradigms, and in different cultures (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010; 
Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; 
Stawarczyk, Cassol, & D’Argembeau, 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & 
D’Argembeau, 2011); these results are summarised in Figure 1.2. This prospective bias, 
together with the findings that MW is often directed towards an individual’s personal goals 
(Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011) 
and that MW is linked with improvements in creative problem solving (Baird et al., 2012), has 
led some researchers to argue that one of the main benefits and functions of MW is to prepare 
and plan for the future (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011); indeed, the idea that mental time travel, such as conscious 
simulations of future events, is a major benefit for the organism, has been also theorised in the 
field of self-regulation and emotional coping (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor 
& Schneider, 1989), and even as one the evolutionary basis for conscious thought (Baumeister 
& Masicampo, 2010; Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011) and the human mind 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  
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Figure 1.2 - Four different studies showing the propensity of individuals of thinking more about the future 
than of the past. A) Adapted from Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010). B) From Stawarczyk et al. (2011); PG and MN 
refer to two experimental conditions in their study. Regardless of condition, participants show the prospective bias. 
C) From Baird et al. (2011); off task thought shows a clear prospective bias, while on task thought is predictably 
directed to the present. D) Adapted from Smallwood et al. (2011); participants show a prospective bias in an easy 
task that allows mind wandering. 
 
1.2.2 Costs of Mind Wandering 
Mind wandering has traditionally been researched by Psychologists as unrelated thoughts 
emerging during an ongoing task, so that its study has often focused on the performance costs 
that occur in this scenario. One such important line of research regards the effects of MW on 
reading comprehension (Franklin, Broadway, Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2013; 
Franklin, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; McVay & Kane, 2012b; Reichle, Reineberg, & 
Schooler, 2010; Sanders, Wang, Schooler, & Smallwood, 2016; Smallwood, McSpadden, & 
Schooler, 2008; Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010; Unsworth & McMillan, 2012; Uzzaman 
& Joordens, 2011). The classic paradigm involves giving participants a text to read, and 
assessing their reading comprehension by means of a questionnaire; importantly their MW is 
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monitored throughout the reading task, either by probing them at certain intervals with 
questions regarding their experiences (probe-caught ES), letting the participants 
spontaneously provide reports of whenever they catch themselves drifting off (self-caught 
ES), or by gathering information at the end of the task by means of a questionnaire 
(retrospective ES). These studies routinely found that MW rates are negatively correlated with 
reading comprehension; some studies also found that this comprehension cost is related to 
differences in eye movements (Franklin et al., 2011; Reichle et al., 2010; Uzzaman & 
Joordens, 2011), working memory capacity (McVay & Kane, 2012b; Unsworth & McMillan, 
2012), and might be caused by disrupting the building of propositional models of the text 
(Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2008). 
 
Another classic line of research investigates the effects of MW on the performance of tasks 
that require a constant attentional engagement, such as the Sustained Attention to Response 
Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). It is widely accepted 
that in such tasks, MW occurrence is related to poor performance such as slower reaction 
times (Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Geden 
& Feng, 2015; Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009; Mcvay & Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012a; 
Smallwood et al., 2004; Thomson, Seli, Besner, & Smilek, 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016; 
Yanko & Spalek, 2014), omissions and errors (Allen et al., 2013; Cheyne et al., 2006, 2009; 
Helton et al., 2009; Mcvay & Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012a; Smallwood et al., 2004; 
Thomson et al., 2014), impaired working memory performance (McVay & Kane, 2012a; 
Mrazek et al., 2012; Teasdale et al., 1995), and higher RTs variability (Cheyne et al., 2009; 
Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013); a summary of these results is shown in Figure 1.3. The strong 
relation between off-task thought and poor performance in demanding tasks is an important 
one, as it allows the use of behavioural performance as a potential objective index of MW in 
the right experimental paradigm. 
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Figure 1.3 – Four studies showing the disruptive effects of MW on tasks that require executive resources. A) 
From McVay & Kane (2012a); participants show lower accuracy when engaged in task-unrelated thought (TUT; 
dotted lines) in two different engaging tasks (white and black lines). B) From Seli et al. (2013); RT variance on a 
metronome response task increases when participants mind wander, regardless if they are aware (“Tuned Out”) of 
it, or not (“Zoned Out”). C) From Mrazek et al. (2012); participants recall fewer items in a working memory task 
(OSPAN task; Turner & Engle, (1989)) if they were mind wandering; the disruptive effect of mind wandering 
increases with task difficulty (increasing the number of items to maintain in working memory). D) Adapted from 
Yanko & Spalek (2014); participants RTs are slower while braking in a high-fidelity driving simulator if they were 
mind wandering compared to being on task.  
 
Finally, another important aspect of MW is its relation to negative mood. There is substantial 
evidence that unhappiness is a correlate of MW (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; Smallwood, O’Connor, 
Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007; Song & Wang, 2012), especially when the latter is directed 
towards past events (Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013; 
Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D’Argembeau, 2013); however, the 
directionality of this relation is still not clear, as studies have suggested both a causal effect of 
induced negative mood on the subsequent frequency of MW (Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood, 
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Fitzgerald, et al., 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, et al., 2013), and the opposite (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Ruby, Smallwood, 
Engen, et al., 2013). It is likely that the two are so closely intertwined, both functionally and 
structurally, that they can’t be temporally disentangled. Although MW has been related to 
negative mood by most studies, it is important to note that at least two studies have also found 
a relation to positive mood in certain cases, specifically when MW is directed towards the 
future instead of the past (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013), and when its content is of 
high interest for the individual (Franklin, Mrazek, et al., 2013). As with any other complex 
and heterogenous phenomenon, analysing the content of MW, and the context in which it 
occurs, is key in understanding the consequences that it will have on the individual and his/her 
performance. 
 
1.3 Mind Wandering Occurrence Depends on Context  
Mind wandering arises more commonly when we are not involved in a demanding task, or in 
a task at all (Antrobus et al., 1966; Konishi, McLaren, Engen, & Smallwood, 2015; Mason, 
Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007; McKiernan, D’Angelo, Kaufman, & 
Binder, 2006; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Teasdale et al., 1995); for example, it is more 
likely that a car passenger would drift off in his/her own thoughts than it would be for the 
driver of the car. This is optimal, as MW can interfere with a concurring task and affect its 
performance. The idea that an adaptive cognitive system has the capacity to regulate the 
occurrence of MW to minimise its costs on task performance has been summarised as the 
context-regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). This hypothesis 
predicts that individuals who are able to limit their MW to non-demanding situations will reap 
the greater benefits, and experience the fewer costs related to this experience. In support of 
this hypothesis, it has been found that when faced with demanding activities, individuals with 
high working memory capacity (WMC) are able to maintain on-task focus, limit their MW, 
and perform better (better accuracy/lower RTs) than individuals with low WMC (Michael J. 
Kane et al., 2007; Mcvay & Kane, 2009); furthermore, it has been shown that, during a low 
demand task, participants with higher WMC also experience more MW episodes than 
participants with lower WMC (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012), suggesting that an 
adaptive system does not reduce the overall amount of MW episodes, but regulates their 
occurrence to times in which they are not disruptive.  
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The frequency of MW thus seems to generally increase linearly as task difficulty decreases 
(Antrobus, 1968; McKiernan et al., 2006; Teasdale et al., 1995), but is also known to increase 
as a task becomes well practiced (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 
2007; Teasdale et al., 1995): this is due to the effects of practice in lowering the executive 
demands of the task, as the cognitive system automatizes the processes needed to perform the 
task optimally, so that fewer decisions have to be made consciously (Newell & Rosenbloom, 
1981; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Teasdale et al., 1995). This is the reason for which, relative 
to a beginner driver, an experienced driver experiences more episodes of MW while driving, 
especially on a well-practiced route (e.g. from home to the office). The fact that MW 
frequency can be modulated by the task demands is important, because it allows some control 
on a phenomenon that is largely spontaneous. The relation between MW frequency, task 
demands and task practice is illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 – Four studies showing the effect of task demands and task practice on mind wandering 
frequency. A) From Antrobus, (1968): stimulus-independent thoughts (y-axis) are less frequent as more 
information is presented to the participants in an auditory detection task. B) Adapted from Konishi et al., (2015): 
thoughts are reported as more off-task in an easier task (0-back) relative to a harder, 1-back working memory task. 
C) Adapted from Mason, Norton, Horn, et al., (2007): areas of the Default Mode Network (DMN), which are 
active during mind wandering episodes, increase activity during task blocks that had been practiced before, relative 
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to novel ones. D) From Teasdale et al., (1995): stimulus-independent thoughts are reported more frequently in two 
different tasks when these had been practiced (white lines) compared to the same unpracticed tasks (black lines). 
 
 
1.4 Mind Wandering Is Heterogenous in Content 
The mere presence (or absence) of MW episodes can often tell very little to the researcher; 
instead, the content of those episodes is equally or more important in determining the costs or 
benefits that they will have on the individual that experiences them. Our minds can travel 
back in time, somehow bypassing the otherwise unbreakable unidirectionality of time 
(Tulving, 2002) and accessing memories of minutes or decades past, can plan events that will 
happen in the future, or imagine fantasies that will never do so. Our brains recombine the 
sensory information that we have perceived in our lives in infinite new ways, rendering our 
mental life unrivaled in richness. Several recent studies have experimentally investigated the 
content of MW episodes and the differential effects that these have on individuals’ well-being. 
As described in section 1.2, it is known that MW can be related to lower mood when oriented 
towards past events (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011) but have benefits, and is generally more 
common, when oriented towards the future (Baird et al., 2011). Similarly, repetitive and 
recurrent thoughts, normally associated with negative outcomes, have been shown to have 
constructive consequences depending on the content, valence and context in which they arise 
(Watkins, 2008). Furthermore future thoughts are generally rated as more positive 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006), providing support to the idea that individuals have 
an optimistic bias towards the future (Taylor & Brown, 1988); on the other hand, thoughts 
about the past have been described as containing more sensory information, being more 
detailed and coherent (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006), although this can vary 
depending on the temporal distance of the event remembered or imagined (D’Argembeau & 
Van Der Linden, 2004). Although having differences, future and past thoughts also show 
remarkable similarities (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; D’Argembeau & Van Der 
Linden, 2004) and have been hypothesized to be intimately related (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) to the point of sharing 
the same neural substrate (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). The idea that the costs and 
benefits of mind wandering strongly depend on the content of these episodes has been 
described as a content-regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
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As the content of MW is basically unlimited, researchers have to investigate this variety while 
somehow constraining it in order to measure it. One potential solution to this problem is to 
ask participants a set number of questions to see if they fit their experience (e.g. “where you 
thinking about the past?”, “where your thoughts positive or negative?”, etc.); this 
methodology, dubbed as experience sampling (Csíkszentmihályi & Larson, 1987; Larson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), is most commonly done either by briefly interrupting participants 
during their daily lives in ecological studies, while they are performing a concurrent task 
(probe-caught ES), or by giving a longer questionnaire at the end of the task (retrospective 
ES). An additional step that can then be taken, is to apply a decomposition technique such as 
principal component analysis (PCA) to check for patterns of covariance in the responses: for 
example, whenever participants report more thoughts about the past it could be that they also 
systematically rate them as more negative. Klinger & Cox (1987) pioneered this method, also 
dubbed multi-dimensional experience sampling (MDES; Konishi & Smallwood, 2016; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) which was then applied by several other researchers to 
investigate a number of different questions, such as: the phenomenology of future-oriented 
MW (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013); the relation between the content of MW and the 
brain’s functional architecture (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et 
al., 2016a); the relation between MW and mood (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013), 
between MW and social problem solving (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013); the 
role of future-directed thought in the processing of personal goals (Medea et al., 2016). An 
example of the MDES approach is shown in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.5 – Adapted from Smallwood et al., (2016b) The figure illustrates the various steps of multi-
dimensional experience sampling. A) Participants are asked questions regarding multiple dimensions of their mind 
wandering experience, through probe-caught ES. B) Principal component analysis is applied in order to investigate 
the possible correlations in the data. C) Visualization of the orthogonal factors in an experimental sample, derived 
from the PCA: six components are derived, three describing the content of thoughts and three describing the form 
of thoughts. D) A replication sample showing principal components largely overlapping with the ones in the 
experimental sample.  
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1.5 Neural and Physiological Correlates of Mind Wandering 
Technological advances in the past decades, such as the development of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI; Kwong et al., 1992; Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990), have 
allowed researchers to look at the relation between cognitive processes and activations in 
areas of the brain, and indeed, to develop the field of cognitive neuroscience all together. In 
the past twenty years, cognitive neuroscience has grown increasingly interested in mind 
wandering after the discovery of the default mode network (DMN; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, 
& Schacter, 2008; Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; McGuire, Paulesu, Frackowiak, & Frith, 1996; 
Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle & Snyder, 2007); the term DMN refers to a series of brain areas 
including medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL) (Buckner et al., 2008). These often show activation in the absence of a 
specific task such as during waking rest, which is also when we are more likely to engage in 
MW (Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). Techniques such as fMRI can be especially 
beneficial when looking at private phenomena such as MW, as they allow the pairing of an 
objective measure (e.g. the change in blood oxygenation levels in certain areas of the brain) to 
a subjective experience (e.g. remembering a childhood memory). Similarly, another line of 
research has used electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the effects of MW on external 
processing; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy (2008) found evidence of reduced 
amplitude of the P3, an event related potential linked to cortical analysis of external stimuli, 
during episodes of MW, a finding replicated by other studies (Barron, Riby, Greer, & 
Smallwood, 2011; Macdonald, Mathan, & Yeung, 2011); similarly, Braboszcz & Delorme 
(2011) found mind wandering episodes to be linked to increases in EEG delta power and to 
elicit a larger P2 component, both phenomena related to decreases in alertness and 
disengagement of participants’ attention to external stimuli (De Gennaro, Ferrara, & Bertini, 
2001; Näätänen & Picton, 1987).  
Indeed, the covert nature of MW is one of the major obstacles in its scientific investigation 
(Konishi & Smallwood, 2016; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), and one solution is to combine 
subjective measures, such as ES, with objective measures; the core idea of this approach, 
dubbed as triangulation, is to obtain several concurring, but different, measures of the same 
phenomenon in order to pinpoint the variance common to all of them and link it with the 
phenomenological experience of the participant (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
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1.5.1 fMRI Correlates of Mind Wandering 
Following this approach, several researchers have shown evidence that directly link activation 
of the DMN with participants’ reports of mind wandering episodes in different contexts 
(Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; K. C. R. Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-
Hanna, & Christoff, 2015), such as drifting off from a demanding task (Christoff, Gordon, 
Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Greicius & Menon, 2004; Mckiernan, Kaufman, 
Kucera-thompson, & Binder, 2003; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011), 
or experiencing mind wandering thoughts during periods of waking rest (Andrews-Hanna, 
Reidler, Huang, et al., 2010) and while performing a well-practiced task (Mason, Norton, Van 
Horn, Wegner, Grafton, Macrae, et al., 2007). In addition to the afore mentioned hubs of the 
DMN (mPFC, PCC and bilateral IPL), a recent neuroimaging meta-analysis (K. C. R. Fox et 
al., 2015) has highlighted the contribution of several other areas in the mind wandering 
phenomenon, such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC), medial temporal lobe (MTL), and insula. Recent studies (Andrews-Hanna, 
Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014) have shown that the 
DMN can be divided into two subsystems, a medial temporal subsystem, active during mental 
time travel, and a dorsal medial subsystem, active during social thinking, such as mentalizing; 
the two subsystems appear to be coordinated by the two major hubs of the DMN, namely the 
mPFC and PCC. Given that the term mind wandering refers to a large variety of self-
generated thought constructs, it is unsurprising that several brain areas are differentially 
involved in the phenomenon.  
The DMN has been implicated in stimulus-independent thought and MW since its discovery 
(Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; McGuire et al., 1996; Raichle et al., 2001), so much so as to 
become known as the task negative network (Spreng, 2012), but recent studies have shown 
that the DMN can be activated, and interact with “task-positive” networks such as the 
executive network (Seeley et al., 2007), during demanding, working memory (Spreng et al., 
2014; Vatansever, Menon, Manktelow, Sahakian, & Stamatakis, 2015) and creativity tasks 
(Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016). Furthermore, the main hubs of the DMN, and 
especially the mPFC, have also consistently been implicated in simple reaction time tasks 
(Burgess, Dumontheil, & Gilbert, 2007; Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2005; Gilbert, Simons, 
Frith, & Burgess, 2006). The observed activity of the DMN during both MW and several 
different tasks engaging attention to external stimuli is important, because it hints to the idea 
that activation in these areas is necessary but not sufficient to describe a MW episode in terms 
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of its neural correlates, as a covert marker should do. The relation between DMN activity, 
mind wandering, and task performance will thus be one of the focuses of this thesis.  
 
1.5.2 Pupillometric Correlates of Mind Wandering 
A further physiological measure that has shown promise as a covert marker of mind 
wandering is pupil dilation. Pupil dilation has been traditionally used in Psychological 
research as a measure of cognitive effort and working memory load, as early studies (Beatty 
& Kahneman, 1966; Hess & Polt, 1964; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966) indicated that pupils’ 
dilation linearly increases with mental effort: for example, individuals’ pupils dilate more if 
they have to remember more items in a short-term memory task, if they have to process read 
or heard complex grammatical sentences, or if they engage in mental arithmetic (Beatty, 
1982).  
Recently, interest in pupillometric measures has newly risen, thanks also to the development 
of a theoretical framework which links the dilation of pupils to arousal, via activity of the 
locus coeruleus (LC), with large pupils indicating a highly aroused, distractible state, and 
small pupils linked to drowsiness (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, & 
Cohen, 1999; Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Murphy, O’Connell, 
O’Sullivan, Robertson, & Balsters, 2014). Arousal has also been classically related to 
behavioral performance through an U-shaped curve (Yerkes-Dodson law) with optimal 
performance found in moderate levels of arousal, and extreme levels linked to disrupted 
performance (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908); it is important to note 
that while this relationship has thus been reported and cited in the past century, the original 
study theorized an U-shaped relationship between arousal and performance only for difficult 
tasks, while suggesting a linear relationship for easy tasks, with increasing arousal linked to 
better performance (Diamond, Campbell, Park, Halonen, & Zoladz, 2007; Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908). Furthermore, this U-shaped relationship is thought to arise from an LC-mediated 
switch from an exploitation to an exploration mode, with moderate levels of arousal 
encouraging task-directed behavior (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Hauser, Fiore, Moutoussis, 
& Dolan, 2016; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011). As mind wandering is also both related to task 
performance and task-disengagement, several researchers have tried to bridge the theoretical 
gap between MW, performance, and pupil dilation (Mittner, Hawkins, Boekel, & Forstmann, 
2016a; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Unsworth & Robison, 2016). 
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Following this theoretical account, prior studies have found that performance is lower when 
pupils are very small or very large (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; 
Van Den Brink, Murphy, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016; Van Orden, Jung, & Makeig, 2000); 
similarly, a few other studies have linked episodes of MW either to large (Franklin, 
Broadway, et al., 2013), or small pupils (Grandchamp, Braboszcz, & Delorme, 2014; 
Unsworth & Robison, 2016). Thus, while pupil dynamics seem to track lapses of attention and 
episodes of mind wandering to a certain level, and although some of these results are 
consistent with the pupil-arousal-performance framework, it is clear that there are several 
important inconsistencies in the literature that need to be addressed. Figure 1.6 provides an 
illustrated summary of the links between pupil dilation, brain activity, and mind wandering. 
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Figure 1.6 - Three studies showing the links between brain activity, pupil dilation and mind wandering. A) 
Adapted from (K. C. R. Fox et al., 2015): a meta-analysis of fMRI studies of MW shows clusters of activation in 
the PCC/precuneus and the dorsal ACC (top sub-panel), and mPFC (bottom sub-panel), associated with mind 
wandering and spontaneous thought processes. Subpanel C of Figure 1.4 also shows activity in PCC and mPFC 
during episodes of MW. B) Adapted from (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011): baseline pupil is higher prior to 
incorrect target responses in a working memory task. Targets were presented at the 0-time mark on the x-axis. C) 
Adapted from (Unsworth & Robison, 2016): baseline pupil is smaller during MW relative to being on-task or to 
being distracted by external stimuli (ED).  
 
1.6 Thesis Outline and Aims 
As discussed so far, applying the scientific method to investigate mind wandering presents 
specific hurdles, also shared by many fields of consciousness research, and the research 
presented in this thesis attempts to solve two of them. The first hurdle is the need to 
consistently elicit a spontaneous phenomenon in an experimental setting: while other 
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cognitive states can be induced with relative ease, such as mood induction through the use of 
music or films (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996), MW is defined as spontaneous 
thoughts unrelated to the main task at hand, and as such it needs a tailored experimental 
paradigm for its emergence. Albeit spontaneous, MW is known to arise more frequently under 
certain circumstances, such as during boring, or easy contexts. In the lab, this corresponds to 
having a context of low task demands: by systematically varying the difficulty of a task, it 
should then be possible to modulate the frequency of MW episodes. The second issue regards 
the ability to objectively measure this heterogenous, intimate conscious phenomenon: the field 
still largely relies on individuals’ self-reports in order to assess their MW experiences, but 
these reports are inherently subjective. However, it should also be possible to track these 
subjective experiences through their physiological correlates and their consequences on 
performance.  
The research conducted in this PhD project sought to develop a paradigm to study mind 
wandering, from the ideation and validation of an experimental task that could entice this 
fleeting phenomenon, to its capture, by combining behavioral, physiological, and subjective 
measures. This paradigm is then used in three empirical studies to understand the neural and 
pupillometric correlates of mind wandering and their potential in the development of a covert 
marker of this phenomenon. 
A full outline of the contribution of each chapter to the thesis’ aims is outlined below: 
 
Chapter 2. The paradigm. This chapter discusses the development of the 0-back/1-back 
paradigm used in the studies presented in this thesis. 
Chapter 3. How understanding the mind wandering state can inform our appreciation 
of conscious experience. This review chapter illustrates the two main experimental issues that 
mind wandering and consciousness researchers face, along with suggestions on how to 
overcome them. 
Chapter 4. The default mode network supports cognition that is independent of 
immediate perceptual input. This empirical chapter explores a novel hypothesis of default 
mode network function, namely that the DMN’s main function is to support cognition 
independent of stimuli that are presently available to the senses. 
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Chapter 5. Pupillometric signatures of fluctuations in external attention. This empirical 
chapter investigates the pupillometric correlates of mind wandering and of external attention. 
In particular, it explores how these can be modulated by task context and mind wandering 
content. 
Chapter 6. The role of practice in task-positive and task-negative default mode network 
activity. This empirical chapter replicates the study presented in Chapter 4 and extends it to 
understand the effect of task practice on goal-directed, and stimulus-independent, DMN 
activity. 
Chapter 7. General discussion. This chapter synthetizes the results from the previous 
chapters to discuss how these studies can contribute to the development of a marker of mind 
wandering. Moreover, this chapter provides directions for future research in this field. 
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Chapter 2. The Paradigm 
The first step in this PhD project involved the development of a task that could manipulate the 
occurrence of MW. This would allow for a certain degree of experimental control on a 
spontaneous phenomenon. Previous studies tried to solve this issue by implicitly relying on 
time: given enough of it, participants’ minds, engaged in some sort of demanding task, would 
inevitably start to wander. The use of these attentionally demanding tasks was also due to the 
fact that, for a long time, mind wandering was almost exclusively defined as “task-irrelevant, 
“task-unrelated”, or “stimulus-independent”: it existed only in juxtaposition to the classic 
experimental tasks of cognitive psychology as an undesirable side effect. The very first 
studies typically used auditory or visual signal-detection tasks (Antrobus, 1968; Antrobus, 
Coleman, & Singer, 1967; Antrobus et al., 1966), with long experimental sessions of about 3 
hours per participant. More recently, studies began to shift towards the use of working 
memory tasks  (Teasdale et al., 1995; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993), sustained 
attention tasks (Robertson et al., 1997), or vigilance tasks (Giambra, 1989, 1995); the latter 
ones being particularly successful at eliciting MW, given the rare need for a participant’s 
response, thus lowering the task’s demands.  
As illustrated in Chapter 1.3, mind wandering is more likely to emerge during low demand 
tasks; on the other hand, MW is infrequent, but has more tangible behavioural costs, when 
arising during demanding tasks, as described in Chapter 1.2.2. A mind wandering paradigm 
should encourage the frequent occurrence of the phenomenon, while at the same time 
providing a challenge to participants: indeed, if they were to perform near ceiling levels, it 
would be impossible to use behavioural performance as an additional marker of MW 
occurrence. One possible solution is to alternate an easy, low-demand task, to a more 
demanding attentional or working memory task.  
 
2.1 The Choice Reaction Time/Working Memory Task 
Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor (2009) first pioneered this idea by making participants 
perform a Choice Reaction Time (CRT), and a Working Memory task (WM), which present 
similar stimuli but vary in the cognitive processes that must be applied to them. The CRT task 
is essentially a vigilance task; participants are shown a stream of single-digit numbers and 
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have to make a decision (is the number odd or even, by pressing one of two keys) whenever a 
rare target digit, differently coloured, is presented. The WM task is a variation of a 1-back 
task; participants again are presented with a stream of digits, but must decide whether the 
stimulus preceding the infrequent target (a coloured “?”) was odd or even, again pressing one 
of two keys. Thus, in the CRT task participants are, for the most part, shown stimuli that are 
irrelevant to the task (the non-targets), and are able to drift off to their self-generated thoughts 
without this affecting their performance; on the other hand, participants in the WM task have 
to be constantly focused on the non-targets because they don’t know when a target will 
appear, probing them to make a decision based on the previously shown stimulus. Although 
the stimuli presented to the participants are essentially the same (streams of numbers), the 
different instructions in the two tasks effectively induce different experiences. This paradigm 
has then been used for several other MW studies (Baird et al., 2012; Smallwood, Schooler, et 
al., 2011; Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013), including fMRI (Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 
2013) and pupillometry (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011) studies: these show consistent 
results, with the CRT task notably eliciting more frequent mind wandering, especially related 
to the future, relative to the WM task. The CRT/WM paradigm is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Adapted from (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011): the CRT and WM tasks show the same stimuli, 
interspersed with fixation crosses, to participants, but the instructions for each task produce different experiences in 
the individuals. In the CRT, participants press one of two keys depending if the green target number (the ‘1’ in the 
figure) is odd or even. In the WM, if a red question mark is presented, participants press one of two keys 
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depending if the previous shown stimulus (the ‘3’ in the figure) was odd or even. In the CRT, participants’ 
attention can drift off during the black non-targets (NTs), without this affecting their capacity to decide if the green 
target is an odd or even digit; in the WM, participants need to constantly monitor and encode the NTs, as a red 
question mark will probe them about the previously shown NT. 
 
This paradigm is well suited for the study of mind wandering, providing two task conditions 
that can be compared and analysed in terms of executive demands, frequency of MW, and 
behavioural performances; additionally, it is easy to couple physiological measures to the 
tasks, such as fMRI and pupillometry. Nevertheless, it suffers from some minor issues, which 
can potentially change participants’ experiences in ways not foreseen by the experimenter. 
Importantly, the key, intended manipulation of the task, is to make participants constantly 
focused and coupled with the external stimuli (the NTs) in the WM task, while allowing 
freedom of thought and cognition for the same NTs in the CRT, as they are not needed to 
perform the task correctly. However, in the WM task a sly participant could choose to rest his 
finger on the “correct” key after being presented a NT, and then updating this for every newly 
presented NT, e.g. a ‘5’ is presented, the sly participant rests his finger on the “odd” response 
key; if a target question mark is then presented, the participant would just need to press the 
key on which his finger is resting, thus not having to encode and maintain the digits 
throughout, effectively lowering the task demands. Secondly, RT analyses of these two task in 
previous studies, either showed no difference in the two tasks (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 
2011), or faster RTs in the demanding task (Baird et al., 2012; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et 
al., 2013); furthermore, target accuracy was found higher in the CRT relative to the WM task 
in a study (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011) while the opposite was found in another study 
(Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013), with a third study finding no significant accuracy 
differences in the two tasks (Baird et al., 2012). The lack of consistent behavioural 
performance is an issue if these are to be used as mind wandering indexes in a paradigm; 
moreover, the more demanding WM task should elicit lower accuracy rates and slower 
reaction times, a pattern not found in the afore mentioned studies. For the purpose of this 
project, the original CRT/WM paradigm was modified in a way that would maximise the 
difference in attentional demands of the two tasks, and also prevent participants to use any 
work arounds.  
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2.2 The 0-back/1-back Task 
One solution was found by using pairs of shapes instead of a stream of single digit numbers as 
the main stimuli used in the two tasks: in the new version of the CRT task, participants see 
two black geometric shapes divided by a blue vertical line. These black pairs are the non-
targets (NTs), and the shapes can either be a circle, triangle, or a square, but never two of the 
same type together; after several NTs, the number of which can be decided on a random or 
semi-random manner, to minimise the effects of anticipation by participants, a pair of blue 
shapes is presented (the target stimulus), divided by a vertical line in the middle of which is 
another small shape, representing one of the two shapes on the sides. When a target is 
presented, the participant needs to make a response by pressing either the left or right arrow 
key, depending on which side the shape shown in the middle is. For example, a target is 
presented with a blue triangle on the left, a blue circle on the right, and a small blue triangle in 
the middle: in this case, the participant would have to press the ‘left’ arrow key, as the triangle 
is on the left. This can be considered a 0-back task, and similarly to the CRT, the response 
depends on the stimuli presented on screen at the moment. In the new WM version, again 
pairs of black shapes are presented as NTs, divided by a red line. The difference is that the 
target stimulus is, in this case, two red question marks, with a small shape in the middle: the 
small shape refers to one of the two presented in the NT just previously shown. The 
participant needs to remember where the shape was, and respond accordingly with the 
right/left arrow keys. This is effectively a 1-back working memory task, in which participants 
need to continuously encode the NTs until a target is presented. The two tasks continuously 
switch between each other after a certain number of target events, and the colour coding (red 
lines for the 1-back, blue lines for the 0-back, which can be counterbalanced) helps 
participants remember in which condition they are. A diagram of the new 0-back/1-back task 
is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 – In the 0-back/1-back paradigm, participants alternate between the two conditions: in both conditions, 
after a certain number of non-targets (NTs), participants are faced with a target decision. In the 0-back condition, 
the decision is based on the presently perceived stimulus (is the square on the left or the right?); the NTs are thus 
irrelevant to the task, allowing for long periods in the 0-back condition when attention is unconstrained by the task. 
Conversely, in the 1-back condition the target decision is based on the previously attended NT (was the square on 
the left or the right?). Under these conditions, participants must maintain external attention on the task in order to 
perform accurately. 
. 
 
In this new version, participants’ attention must be constantly coupled to the NT stimuli in the 
1-back task; on the other hand, the 0-back task largely allows participants’ attention to 
fluctuate between the task and internal thoughts, without affecting their performance. 
Furthermore, different types of stimuli in the two task conditions can shift the locus of 
attention between internal and external cognition: for example, to respond correctly to the 
targets in the 0-back task, it is necessary to be focused on the presented external stimulus, as it 
is to encode the NTs in the 1-back task. On the other hand, to respond to targets in the 1-back 
task, internal cognition is needed to recall the position of the previously encoded NT; internal 
cognition also likely plays a part during presentation of the 0-back NTs, in which participants 
are free to drift off to their own thoughts, without consequences. 
The use of this type of paradigm not only fixes the issues that the previous CRT/WM task 
had, but it leaves the door open to further variations: depending on the researcher’s interest, 
the basic, geometrical shapes can be substituted by more complex stimuli, such as written 
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words or pictures (faces, landscapes, objects etc.): at least one recent fMRI study has taken 
this approach, modifying the 0-back/1-back by using pictures of objects instead of shapes 
(Murphy et al., in review). Moreover, like the CRT/WM, the 0-back/1-back paradigm can be 
easily coupled with several physiological measures, as it is easy to run in an MRI scanner or 
with an eye-tracker camera, and importantly, this paradigm is well suited to be paired with 
experience sampling (ES) techniques, such as multi-dimensional experience sampling 
(MDES; referenced in chapter 1.4).  
 
2.3 Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling 
One way to sample participants’ inner experiences, is to present a retrospective questionnaire 
at the end of the experimental session, asking them to self-report their levels of focus and 
engagement throughout the task; several such questionnaires exist and have been successfully 
used in MW studies (Barron et al., 2011; Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Smallwood, Brown, Baird, 
Mrazek, et al., 2012), such as the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 
1999), Amsterdam Resting-State Questionnaire (ARSQ, Diaz et al., 2013), and New York 
Cognition Questionnaire (NYCQ; Gorgolewski et al., 2014). These have the advantage of 
being administered after completion of the task, so that participants are not disturbed or 
interrupted, which can be important for certain covert measures such as fMRI; on the other 
hand, such retrospective measures require participants to average and rate their experiences 
over the course of several minutes, which can lead to a loss of specificity and be prone to 
cognitive biases (e.g. recency/primacy biases).  
Another possibility is to use probe-caught ES, in which participants are intermittently 
interrupted during a concurrent task, and probed regarding the contents of their experience 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). The probes are usually administered on a random or semi-
random basis, and have the advantage of potentially capturing individual instances of mind 
wandering episodes: this is important if the researcher is interested in online measurements 
(e.g. was the report of a specific MW episode preceded by a certain pattern of brain activity?) 
and not just overall MW rates, in which case a retrospective questionnaire can be satisfactory. 
Furthermore, participants can describe their experiences as they just happened, so that these 
reports are less likely to be affected by temporal degradation or other cognitive biases, as it 
can happen with retrospective reports. On the other hand, probe-caught ES can be disruptive 
to the normal flow of the concurrent task, and the rate of probes has been shown to affect the 
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rate of MW reports, (Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013), with MW reports decreasing as 
the number of probes in a session increase.  
In probe-caught ES, as in retrospective ES, participants are typically asked several questions 
(also called thought-probes) regarding their experience: examples of typical questions are the 
task-focus of thoughts (on-task VS. off-task/MW), the temporal direction of thoughts (past 
VS. future), the form of thoughts, such as thinking in images, words, or the level of detail of 
thoughts. In the case of probe-caught ES, many such probes can be administered in a single 
session to one participant, so that the final dataset results in a large number of thought probes, 
each of which contains several individual questions (task focus, temporal direction, etc.). One 
issue with this method is that mind wandering episodes are often varied in content and form, 
and individual questions can only capture separate aspects of an episode; moreover, there is a 
chance that some questions could be highly correlated between each other (e.g. most thoughts 
about the past are also very detailed), and this relation would also not be captured by 
analysing the individual scales. As mentioned in Chapter 1.4, one way to process such a 
dataset is to reduce its dimensions by work of a factor analysis, such as principal component 
analysis (PCA); PCA is a statistical method that reduces multi-dimensional data to a set of 
fewer, orthogonal (and thus uncorrelated) dimensions, called principal components. Applying 
PCA to a set of thought probes controls for the possible correlations between the different 
scales, and the principal components thus obtained can then be projected back onto the probe-
level dataset, so that each thought probe is described not only by the individual questions, but 
also by the principal components, each of which is weighted based on how much it is 
described by that specific probe. For example, the PCA might result in a principal component 
describing detailed thoughts about the past, which would be heavily weighted on the “past” 
and “detailed” questions, but not on other questions. When this component is then projected 
back at the probe-level, its weight depends on the specific thought probe: it would have a high 
value if, for a specific probe, the participant had responded highly on the individual scales of 
“past” and “detailed” thoughts, and vice versa. These resulting principal components, which 
attempt to capture the relation between multiple dimensions of thought in a reduced number 
of measures, can then be analysed without potential correlational confounds. This 
methodology, also known as multi-dimensional experience sampling (MDES; Konishi & 
Smallwood, 2016; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), is summarised in Figure 1.5. 
The 0-back/1-back task here presented can be paired with either ES method. Retrospective 
questionnaires can always be administered at the end of a task session, the length of which can 
44 
 
be manipulated if concerns arise regarding the ability of participants to report on their overall 
rates of MW throughout the task: shorter sessions should help in this sense. In the same way, 
thought probes can be easily inserted in the task if a probe-caught ES is preferred, such as 
presenting a thought probe in place of a target. If such probe-caught ES is then paired with a 
physiological measure (fMRI, EEG, pupillometry, etc.), this would allow several analyses of 
interest to be conducted. For example, it would be possible to compare what brain activity (or 
pupil dynamic) is common (or different) when participants report being off-task and when 
they respond incorrectly or slow to a target, by analysing the time windows preceding a target 
or a thought probe. The rate of presentation of such probes in place of targets can in turn be 
manipulated, so as to have enough reports without excessively disrupting the natural flow of 
the task.  
By combining a dual task with experience sampling and physiological measures, the paradigm 
presented in this chapter attempts to solve two important issues in mind wandering research: 
eliciting this spontaneous phenomenon, and measuring it as objectively as possible. These are 
problems shared by other fields of consciousness research, and the next chapter discusses how 
the study of MW can help in finding a solution to these issues. 
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Chapter 3. How Understanding the Mind 
Wandering State Can Inform Our Appreciation of 
Conscious Experience 
The following chapter has been adapted from: 
Konishi, M., & Smallwood, J. (2016). Shadowing the wandering mind: how understanding 
the mind wandering state can inform our appreciation of conscious experience. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 7(4), 233–246. 
 
3.1 Abstract 
The mind wandering state illustrates two fundamental aspects of consciousness: its generative 
nature, which is reflected by the stimulus-independent content of thought that occurs when 
our minds wander; and metacognition, the unique capacity of the mind to reflect and 
understand itself. Self-generated thought, which allows us to consider people and events that 
are not present in the immediate environment, and metacognition, allowing us to introspect 
and report our inner experiences, are both essential to the scientific study of mind wandering. 
Nevertheless, they also inevitably lead to specific issues that mirror more general problems in 
the field of consciousness research. The generative nature of consciousness makes it difficult 
to have direct control on the phenomenon, and the act of introspecting on inner experience has 
the potential to influence the state itself. We illustrate how the field of mind wandering 
research can overcome these problems. Its generative nature can be understood by 
triangulating the objective measures (such as neural function) with subjective measures of 
experience and it can be manipulated indirectly by varying the demands of the external 
environment. Furthermore, we describe candidate covert markers for the mind wandering 
state, which allow the phenomenon to be observed without direct interference, minimizing the 
concern that instructions to introspect necessarily change conscious experience. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Conscious experience is one of the most self-evident aspects of the human condition and yet 
its operation remains a mystery. There are at least two aspects of consciousness that are 
central to its status as a topic of scientific enquiry and that are also at the core of what makes 
it an empirically difficult line of investigation: its generative, stimulus-independent nature and 
its unique capacity to reflect and understand itself, also known as metacognition. The 
stimulus-independency of consciousness refers to the fact that its continuous stream of content 
is always active and can often be unrelated to the immediate environment (Antrobus et al., 
1966; Giambra, 1993; Pope, 2013; Singer, 1966, 1993; Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015; Wegner, 1997). Metacognition is the capacity of consciousness to introspect 
its own processing, allowing people to report their inner experiences (Flavell, 1979; Koriat, 
2006; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Nelson, 1996; J. D. Smith, 2009). Both stimulus 
independence of conscious experience and its meta-cognitive access are exemplified in the 
experiences that arise during the mind wandering state. 
Mind wandering refers to the experience that attention is not always tied to an external task 
being performed or to stimuli in the present environment, and that instead mental content can 
be experienced that is generated by the individual (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). The mind 
wandering state makes up at least 25-50% of our waking lives (Michael J Kane et al., 2007; 
Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and shows similar features across many different cultures 
(such as a focus on the future) (Giambra, 1982; Giambra & Stone, 1982; Singer & McCraven, 
1961; Song & Wang, 2012). Mind wandering has broad implications for the human condition: 
for example, it has been linked to disruption of comprehension of material during reading 
(Dixon & Bortolussi, 2013; Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood, Fishman, & Schooler, 2007) and 
understanding of lectures in an educational context (Szpunar, Khan, & Schacter, 2013), issues 
in performance of executive control tasks (Mrazek et al., 2012), or being associated with 
unpleasant mood (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, 
et al., 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). It has also been suggested to play a role in 
planning (Baird et al., 2011; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Schooler, et 
al., 2011) and creative insight (Baird et al., 2012).  
Contemporary accounts suggest that at least two different component processes are engaged 
during the mind wandering state: a decoupling process, which allows inner experience to be 
independent from events in the external environment; and a representational process, which 
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provides mental content that is not directly attributable to the events in the here and now 
(Kam & Handy, 2013; Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). As the 
representations upon which we are focused during mind wandering are different from those 
related to the stimuli in the moment, these experiences are, by definition, stimulus 
independent. Moreover, the gold standard method to assess the mind wandering state is 
experience sampling, which in turn depends on our capacity to introspect on our own 
experiences. Our capacity for meta-cognition is therefore a key element to the mind 
wandering state since it is how participants share their experiences with the experimenter. The 
experience of mind wandering seems to have a parallel in night dreaming. Both are forms of 
self-generated thought that require decoupling from the external environment; both depend on 
mental content that is self-generated based on prior experience. The two phenomena also 
seem to rely on overlapping brain areas and networks, so that it has been suggested that 
dreaming is “an intensified version of mind wandering” (K. C. R. Fox, Nijeboer, Solomonova, 
Domhoff, & Christoff, 2013). Indeed, the term daydreaming might hold more scientific truth 
than previously assumed. Meta-cognition and stimulus independent representations are both 
important in other aspects of research into conscious experience and these are summarized in 
Figure 3.1, illustrating the paradigms of resting-state fMRI, continuous flash suppression 
(CFS), and binocular rivalry (explained in Box 1). 
 
3.3 Challenges of Exploring the Wandering Mind - Stimulus 
Independence 
Although stimulus independence is a hallmark of consciousness, it is also at the center of key 
methodological challenges in studying this aspect of the human condition. Since what we are 
aware of, is not always the same as the stimulus environment in which an experience occurs, 
the degree of mapping between the input into the system and the emergence of conscious 
experience can vary significantly across different situations. This is exemplified by the 
thoughts that occur during mind wandering, in which external stimuli are only minimally 
integrated into the content of our thoughts. This independence between the stimulus 
environment and experience means that controlling or manipulating perception-action 
contingencies alone cannot isolate the neurocognitive basis of consciousness. This 
dissociation between input and experience is obvious in the case of the thoughts that arise 
during the mind wandering state. It is an explicit assumption of researchers that the mental 
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content that arises during the mind wandering state is intrinsically driven and that this limits 
the capacity of the experimenter to directly manipulate the state (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015). Researchers can exploit the stimulus-independent nature of the thoughts that occur 
during the mind wandering state to understand this feature of conscious experience. In a 
similar fashion, a number of paradigms have been developed in other fields, especially in 
visual awareness research, which aim to zone in on a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) 
(Chalmers, 2000) by exploiting its stimulus-independent nature. In Box 1 we briefly describe 
some of these paradigms, but see Axelrod, Bar, & Rees, (2015) and Kim & Blake, (2005) for 
more extensive reviews of this area of investigation. 
 
BOX 1 – The Stimulus-Independent Nature of Consciousness in Different Experimental 
Paradigms 
To study consciousness, paradigms are needed that capture its stimulus-independent nature. In 
the last decade, different paradigms have been developed that explore changes in 
psychological or neurocognitive processing that are minimally caused by external events. 
• Mind wandering studies explore how conscious attention can be devoted to 
representations that are independent of stimuli in the environment. Typical paradigms involve 
asking participants to perform tasks of varying levels of external demands and to use 
combinations of different types of experience sampling to assess the conditions under which 
conscious experience has ceased to focus on events in the environment and instead has 
become directed to mental content that has been self-generated by the participant. By 
understanding the psychological and neural features of the representations that are not directly 
caused by environmental stimulation, studies of the mind wandering state can reveal the 
neural processes that are associated with stimulus independent conscious states.  
• Resting-state. Advances in cognitive neuroscience have allowed investigation of 
neurocognitive processes that take place during wakeful rest. Studies of resting-state assess 
neurocognitive function when participants have no explicit task to do.  Collecting measures of 
neural function under conditions with no salient environmental input allows the assessment of 
how the brain organizes itself. 
• Masking paradigms provide a simple environment in which to study access to 
stimulus independent aspects of conscious experience. In a typical study, a target stimulus is 
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briefly flashed for a few milliseconds, and is preceded and/or followed by another stimulus, 
known as a mask. By varying the presentation time of the target, mask, or the inter-stimulus 
interval between the two, it is possible to create conditions in which the participant’s ability to 
report the identity of the stimulus is at chance level. As the physical, objective features 
(presentation time, size, contrast, etc.) of the stimulus presented are unchanged between 
unseen and seen trials, it is hypothesized that the differences between the two reflect the 
neurocognitive basis of conscious experience of perceptual information (Dehaene, 2011; 
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). 
• Perceptual rivalry paradigms allow processes involved in shifts in conscious access 
to be determined. One such paradigm is binocular rivalry in which participants are presented 
with one image to each eye. Instead of perceiving two superimposed images, subjects usually 
perceive the images to alternate every few seconds. As with masking paradigms, the physical 
properties of the two images remain unchanged so neurocognitive changes that are correlated 
with changes in perception may reflect processes that are important for shifts in the content of 
consciousness. 
• Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) is a particular 
paradigm combining aspects of binocular rivalry and masking paradigms, in which images 
flashed into one eye reliably suppress visual awareness of an image presented to the other eye. 
CFS has gained incredible traction in consciousness research because it seems to allow 
participants to be exposed to stimuli that do not reach consciousness for much longer 
durations than with classical masking or binocular rivalry paradigms, thus improving the 
exploration of unconscious processes. 
 
3.4 Challenges of Studying the Wandering Mind - Introspection 
The stimulus independent aspects of consciousness can be explored by exploiting the second 
aspect of the experience: the capacity for introspective access to the contents of awareness. 
The use of self-report to understand the nature of conscious experience has a long history in 
psychology. It is widely accepted that Wilhelm Wundt was one of the first scientist to adopt 
the introspective method, which he used to explore the relationship between task stimuli and 
an individual’s subsequent experience, although he was careful to point out that the method 
should only be used under carefully controlled conditions (Costall, 2006; Danziger, 1980; 
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Schultz & Schultz, 2007). This method was expanded and applied to experimental psychology 
by, among others, Alfred Binet in France, and Oswald Külpe and Karl Marbe in Germany, 
and Edward Titchener, who pioneered the use of introspection to understand other mental 
processes such as memory, thinking or attention (Schultz & Schultz, 2007). The application of 
introspection in experimental psychology was then heavily criticized by the Behaviourist 
movement led by John Watson, which rejected it as a truly scientific methodology in favour 
of the study of behaviour. It was not until the 1950s with the rise of the Cognitive Revolution 
that introspection became a tenable scientific approach again with the development of a 
variety of methodologies, such as experience sampling (ES; Csíkszentmihályi & Larson, 
1987; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) and the think-aloud protocol (van Someren, Barnard, 
& Sandberg, 1994), in which participants are asked to verbalize their every thought as they 
perform a particular task. The resulting verbal protocols are then analyzed to provide insight 
into how cognitive processes are organized to perform a particular task. 
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Figure 3.1 - The Stimulus-Independent Nature of Consciousness: A) Regions of the default mode network 
(DMN) activate during mind wandering. Data taken from (Allen et al., 2013). B) The same network shows co-
ordinated activity during wakeful rest, in the absence of any particular task. Data taken from (Smith et al., 2009). 
C) In continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) participants are consciously unaware 
of a stimulus presented to one eye as it becomes masked by another stimulus presented to the other eye. D) In 
binocular and perceptual rivalry paradigms (subpanels a) and b), respectively), what is consciously perceived 
changes even though the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The effects of the two paradigms correlate in 
individuals (subpanels c) and d)). Figure taken from (Baker, Karapanagiotidis, Coggan, Wailes-Newson, & 
Smallwood, 2015). 
 
In mind wandering research introspection is especially important, as the experience is often 
entirely unrelated to events in the here and now or any particular task being performed. This 
independence of a participant’s experience from any perception-action contingencies means 
that experience sampling is the only way to directly discern instances of spontaneous self-
generated thought. The systematic investigation of the mind wandering state using the 
technique of experience sampling began in the 1960’s with the pioneering work of Jerome 
Singer, John Antrobus and Eric Klinger and is still the gold standard in this field of research 
(Antrobus et al., 1966; Singer, 1966, 1993; Singer & McCraven, 1961). Experience sampling 
refers to the systematic collection of self-reports of a participant’s ongoing experience 
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(Kahneman et al., 2004a; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Online probe-caught ES requires 
participants to answer random or quasi-random questions regarding their experience either in 
the lab or in daily life (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Retrospective ES involves the 
gathering of self-reports at the end of a task, either via questionnaires or open-ended 
questions. Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) is a particular 
type of ES in which participants record their inner experiences throughout the day and then 
subsequently report them to the researcher in an expositional interview. 
Although metacognition provides access to the stimulus independent features of conscious 
experience, it is not without limitations: for example, online ES is problematic because it 
disrupts the natural evolution of experience. By periodically interrupting participants during 
the course of a task, the natural dynamics of performance and of the phenomenon measured 
(in this case, mind wandering). Moreover, repeatedly probing participants about their 
experience is likely to alert them of the key dependent variable measured by the experiment 
and once more, to alter its natural occurrence (Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013). Some other 
fundamental issues of introspective evidence are its inherent subjectivity, confabulations, the 
interference between cognitive processes, and the privacy of mental content: unlike objective 
measures, such as response times, the veracity of subjective experiences cannot be (yet) 
verified with additional measures, as the participant is the only one to have direct access to 
his/her own mental content. It is also well known that in many cases people have little 
introspection access to a variety of cognitive processes; for example, participants can be 
unaware of the real reasons that influence a decision and at the same time confabulate that 
another reason is the cause (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Introspecting and reporting one’s own mental content also involves performing two 
tasks at the same time. The act of introspection, therefore, might influence the mental content 
that is being experienced. This could either alter the likelihood that a particular form of 
experience will arise, or could change the qualities that the experience will have. Finally, there 
are cases in which participants might be unwilling to share certain private experiences, so that 
their reports could be systematically biased. Participants might purposely omit to report 
cultural/social taboo subjects, such as an embarrassing memory or a violent or erotic fantasy, 
and report a more “neutral” narrative. 
Studies of mind wandering, therefore, highlight one of the fundamental paradoxes in studying 
conscious experience: without the capacity for metacognitive access to our experiences, 
studies of conscious experience would be almost impossible; however, our access to our own 
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experience means that the method of inquiry as part of an experiment may fundamentally alter 
the conscious experience itself. These issues between self-reports and the mind wandering 
state can be seen as arising from more general problems of a science of consciousness that 
relies simply on the introspective method. 
 
3.5 Refining Methods of Measuring Mind Wandering 
In the last decade, important strides in understanding conscious experience have been made 
through the refinement of the method through which self-reports are collected. In the domain 
of mind wandering one way that this has occurred is through the investigation of different 
types of mind wandering. Work on the functional outcomes of the mind wandering state has 
highlighted that it has both costs and benefits (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015): it affords 
creative and planning processes when external demands are low but can disrupt task 
performance when external task demands are elevated (McVay & Kane, 2012a; Mrazek et al., 
2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). This is known as the context-regulation 
hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013).  Other work has highlighted that the nature 
of the experience that emerges during mind wandering has implications for measures of well-
being, with negative or past related experiences being linked to higher unhappiness (Poerio et 
al., 2013; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, et al., 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). This is known 
as the content-regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). 
One reason why this complex pattern of costs and benefits may arise is because there are 
several, different types of experience that emerge in the mind wandering state, each associated 
with unique functional outcomes, and initial ES methods were too crude to accurately 
differentiate between these distinctive states. For example, one fMRI investigation has 
directly tested the possibility that mind wandering depends on the interaction of two 
orthogonal dimensions, task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency, and has distinctive neural 
correlates when compared to external distractions or internal, task-related thoughts 
(Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011).  Other  recent work has focused on patterns of 
co-variation between different aspects of the mind wandering state using the technique of 
Multidimensional Experience Sampling (MDES) (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015): this refers to the investigation of mental content through questionnaires 
and/or thought probes acquiring a large amount of data with questions investigating different 
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aspects of experience, and then using dimension reduction techniques such as principal 
component analysis to reveal the dimensions that underlie these data. This methodology has 
shown to reliably reproduce certain dimensions of the content of mind wandering experience, 
for example patterns of temporal (future-past) thought (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015). Using techniques that focus on co-variation between experiential features of 
the mind wandering state has made it possible to identify structural patterns in experience 
sampling reports. These are consistent across different samples of individuals and correspond 
in broad terms to patterns of thought (shown in Figure 3.2, sub-panel A). Importantly the 
different categories of thought explain unique variation associated functional outcomes: 
measures of emotional state, physiological arousal and ongoing task performance have all 
been shown to vary with differences in the content of experience that arises during the mind 
wandering state (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
 
Figure 3.2 - Refining measures of introspection: A) Applying statistical methods such as principal component 
analysis to multidimensional experience sampling (MDES) data, shows that self-generated thought has a stable 
internal structure. Data taken from two different samples of healthy adults (n=87 & n= 64 respectively) see (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013) for details of the method. B) 
Metacognition for perception and memory depend on different neural substrates and are not correlated across 
individuals. Figure adapted from (Baird, Mrazek, Phillips, & Schooler, 2014; Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & 
Margulies, 2013). C) By combining MDES and neurocognitive measures, it is possible to investigate the neural 
substrates of different types of self-generated thought, such as future- and past-related thought. Figure adapted 
from (Gorgolewski et al., 2014). 
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One way that the utility of experience sampling could be improved is through an assessment 
of the accuracy of the reports. In this regard, important strides have been through the 
development of the meta-d’ measure (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), which objectively measures 
metacognitive sensitivity using signal detection theory (SDT).  SDT was originally developed 
to measure stimulus discrimination accuracy independently of response bias (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005): in standard stimulus discrimination experiments, participants are involved 
in forced-choice tasks (known as the “type 1 task”), classifying a range of stimuli. On top of 
this, participants can be asked to classify their confidence level on the response they just made 
(type 2, or metacognitive task). SDT can be applied to both tasks to get a measure of 
participants’ sensitivity in the stimulus discrimination (type I d-prime) or metacognitive task 
(type 2 d-prime): Maniscalco & Lau, (2012) extended this method by “characterizing the 
observed type 2 sensitivity as the value of d’ that a metacognitively optimal observer would 
have required to produce the empirically observed type 2 data”. In this sense, meta-d’ is a 
measure of type 2 sensitivity expressed at the level of type 1 d’, or in other words, a measure 
of the signal that is available to the subject to perform the type 2, metacognitive, task and is 
not influenced by either response bias or type 1 sensitivity. 
The development of meta-d’ has revolutionised the understanding of metacognition because 
through a process of triangulation with objective neurocognitive markers, it has revealed the 
complex and heterogeneous nature of the metacognitive state. Fleming and colleagues 
(Fleming & Dolan, 2014; Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & 
Rees, 2010) found evidence for a neural substrate of metacognitive ability for perceptual 
decision-making in a region of rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex. Building on these findings, it 
has been identified that metacognition for different aspects of experience depend on different 
neural substrates (see Figure 3.2, subpanel B, showing different neural substrates for meta-
cognition of perception, and memory) (Baird, Mrazek, et al., 2014; Baird et al., 2013; 
McCurdy et al., 2013). Intriguingly, the integrity of key aspects of the default mode network 
(DMN, the medial pre-frontal cortex, precuneus and the inferior parietal lobule) determines an 
individual’s metacognitive accuracy for information from memory (Baird et al., 2013), an 
observation that is important for understanding the role of the DMN in the mind wandering 
state (see Box 3: Open Questions). 
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3.6 Triangulation as a Method for Understanding Conscious Experience 
Although it is possible to refine measures of ES, the inherent limitations of this approach 
mean that it will be necessary to develop measures that provide a proximal measure of 
conscious experience without requiring participants to actively report on the contents of their 
experience. Ultimately, it is only with this development that it is possible to address whether 
the act of introspection as part of the experimental procedure produces the effects that are 
measured by the paradigm. One way that this could be achieved is to explore the neural basis 
of the experiences that subjective reports are used to assess, the so-called neural correlate of 
consciousness. By pairing subjective reports with neurocognitive measures, it may be possible 
to develop techniques that infer inner mental states without relying on introspection. 
The combination of objective and subjective information is referred to as the process of 
triangulation (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Borrowing this 
term from the field of land surveying, triangulation refers to the pairing of subjective reports 
with behavioural and physiological measures, in order to minimize the weaknesses, and 
maximize the strengths of each type of measure. In mind-wandering research, triangulation 
can be achieved in different ways. For example, it is known that mind-wandering is more 
common in easy or practiced tasks (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 
2007; Teasdale et al., 1995) and behavioural performance is usually spared in these cases. 
This well documented situational modulation of the mind-wandering state allows researchers 
to explore objective neurocognitive measures in non-demanding conditions, or at rest, as a 
proximal measure of the mind-wandering state. In principle, these gross situational variations 
can be compared to online measures of ES to explore similarities in objective measures (such 
as the BOLD signal). 
A second way to use triangulation in mind-wandering research is to exploit the capacity for 
these experiences to disrupt performance on a wide range of demanding tasks (Feng, D’Mello, 
& Graesser, 2013; Franklin et al., 2011; McVay & Kane, 2012a; Mrazek et al., 2012; 
Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Szpunar et al., 2013); even when performance is not 
completely disrupted, there is evidence that mind-wandering episodes alter behavioural 
performance in other ways, such as increasing response variability (Bixler & D’Mello, 2013; 
Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2013). Under demanding conditions, if a participant reports an episode of 
mind-wandering and her performance in that period was also impaired, this would provide 
supporting evidence that attention was decoupled from events in the here and now.  
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Reports of mind wandering episodes can be further corroborated by the use of different 
physiological or neurocognitive measures. Using fMRI, it is now well known that mind-
wandering is linked to activity of the default mode network (DMN), a large scale network 
anchored by hubs on the anterior and posterior medial surface of the cortex (Allen et al., 2013; 
Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, et al., 2010; Konishi et al., 2015; Mason, Norton, Van Horn, 
Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007; McKiernan et al., 2006). Similarly, differences between 
periods of on task versus mind-wandering periods have been found using EEG (Baird, 
Smallwood, Lutz, & Schooler, 2014; Barron et al., 2011; Cunningham, Scerbo, & Freeman, 
2000; Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008), pupillometry (Franklin, Broadway, et al., 2013; 
Smallwood, Brown, Baird, Mrazek, et al., 2012; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011) and eye 
movements or blinks (Bixler & D’Mello, 2014; Reichle et al., 2010; Smilek et al., 2010). 
Following our example, if a participant’s report of a mind-wandering episode in an MRI 
scanner was accompanied by poor task performance, heightened baseline pupil dilation and 
concurrent activation of the default mode network, this triangulation of physiology, 
behaviour, experience and neural processing would provide converging evidence that 
attention was decoupled from the events in the here and now. Figure 3.3 illustrates four 
examples on how different methods of ES, such as online probes vs. retrospective 
questionnaires, can be paired with different neurocognitive measures, such as 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and Pupillometry. 
The process of triangulation is important in other paradigms that explore conscious 
awareness, as for example with the combination of the binocular rivalry paradigm with 
pupillometry and optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) measures in a study by Frässle and colleagues 
(Frässle, Sommer, Jansen, Naber, & Einhäuser, 2014). Using this technique, they showed that 
the OKN and pupil diameter were reliably tracking rival alternating percepts, as measured by 
participants’ reports. Furthermore, they showed that the act of reporting modulated both the 
speed of rival percepts alternation and the activation of frontal brain areas, which could be 
dissociated by pure rivalry alternations and seemed to reflect only the act of introspection and 
reporting. Their conclusions focus on three key points: 1) they could track a subjective 
experience (the alternation of rival percepts) using only objective measures (OKN and 
pupillometry), 2) the act of reporting changed the experience itself, by accelerating the 
alternation of percepts, and 3) much of the frontal brain activation present in fMRI binocular 
rivalry studies could be explained simply by self-monitoring and the act of reporting, and not 
the phenomenon itself.  
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Figure 3.3 - Experience Sampling (ES) and Neurocognitive Measures: A) The amplitude of a positive event-
related potential, the P3, as measured through EEG, is reduced during periods of off-task thought compared to on-
task, as measured through online ES. Figure adapted from (Kam et al., 2010). B) Online ES can also be paired with 
pupillometry, showing larger pupil dilation in period of off-task thought compared to on-task. Figure adapted from 
(Franklin, Broadway, et al., 2013). C) Retrospective ES shows reduced evoked responses to target stimuli during 
off-task thought. Figure adapted from (Barron et al., 2011). D) Pairing of retrospective ES and pupillometry, 
showing a relation between mind-wandering, reaction times and pupil dilation. Figure taken from (Smallwood, 
Brown, Baird, Mrazek, et al., 2012). 
 
The discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using participants’ reports in 
consciousness research has received a lot of attention in the last few decades (Tsuchiya, 
Frässle, Wilke, & Lamme, 2016), and while the development of an objective marker of 
conscious experience is necessary to advance the field, subjective reports remain the gold 
standard for accessing participants’ inner experiences. Moving towards a covert marker of the 
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mind-wandering state requires that research focus on how accurately people can introspect on 
the contents of their experience. It is possible that incorporating techniques of hypnosis could 
help in maximizing participants’ differences between their external vs. internal awareness, and 
shed light on the role of meta-awareness in self-generated thought, as was shown in a recent 
study (Demertzi, Vanhaudenhuyse, Noirhomme, Faymonville, & Laureys, 2014). 
Nevertheless, another recent study (Seli et al., 2015) suggests that participants have 
reasonable metacognitive access to their experience; the combination of this method with 
behavioral measures linked to the mind-wandering state can help to define an objective 
marker of conscious experience in the near future, in a way similar to Frässle and colleagues’ 
study.   
 
3.7 The Mind-Wandering State as a Paradigm for Assessing Conscious 
Experience 
It is clear that canonical features of conscious experience (stimulus independency and 
metacognitive access) that are the core of its value as a topic of investigation are also central 
to the empirical challenges that it poses as an experimental phenomenon. It is equally apparent 
that the mind-wandering state embodies both features of conscious experience in a manner 
that can be readily accessed in the real world as well as under controlled laboratory 
conditions. This combination of the applicability of the mind-wandering state to 
consciousness research with the empirical tractability of its investigation means that it 
provides a powerful paradigm to understand the conscious state (Box 2). 
BOX 2 – Capturing the wandering mind 
The mind-wandering state is a common example of a conscious state that involves both 
stimulus-independence and metacognition that is common in daily life. There are at least three 
ways that mind-wandering can provide a useful paradigm to understand key aspects of 
conscious experience.  
• Comparison of situational modulation and transient occurrence. The thoughts 
and feelings that emerge in the mind wandering state are transient changes motivated by 
intrinsic processes and this spontaneous feature of the experience makes it hard to understand. 
Studies, however, have shown that the occurrence of unrelated thoughts wanes as the 
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complexity of an external task increases (context-regulation hypothesis). The situational 
modulation of the mind-wandering state allows the researcher to exert indirect control over 
the occurrence of the mind-wandering state and so develop more causal accounts of the 
experience. 
• Combining online and retrospective experience sampling. Online and 
retrospective measures of ES both provide ways to access subjective aspects of experience; 
however, they both have different weaknesses. Online ES is disruptive of the natural 
dynamics of a task, whereas Retrospective ES is limited in temporal specificity since it relies 
on a person’s memory. Complementary experimental findings from different ES techniques, 
however, cannot be the result of limitations in either approach and so provide a less biased 
method of exploring the mind-wandering state.   
• Combination of objective and subjective markers. Subjective measures of 
experience remain the gold standard measure of the mind-wandering state, however, in 
isolation these cannot be verified. Studies have shown that the mind-wandering state has 
objective behavioural and neural correlates (Smallwood, Brown, Baird, Mrazek, et al., 2012). 
Common neural markers associated with both experiential measures of mind-wandering and 
its associated behavioural consequences, allow researchers to identify verifiable accounts of 
this aspect of conscious experience. 
 
We have developed a paradigm that takes advantage of how the mind-wandering state can be 
assessed in the laboratory (Konishi et al., 2015). In a recent version of this paradigm 
(illustrated in Figure 3.4) participants alternate between task blocks that require constant 
external attention (1-back) and blocks that only require rare, highlighted moments of external 
attention in order to be performed successfully (0-back). This manipulation allows the 
occurrence of mind-wandering to be manipulated indirectly. Performance failure on the 1-
back condition reflects periods when explicit maintenance of the task fails allowing for 
objective indicators that attention is decoupled form the tasks. The task can be combined with 
different measures of neurocognitive functioning (such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, pupillometry) allowing objective information to be gained on the status of ongoing 
cognitive processing. Finally, in this paradigm experience can be measured using both online 
and retrospective ES. In combination with objective indicators this would allow the 
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identification of covert markers of the mind-wandering state that could not be determined by 
the act of introspection.   
BOX 3 – Open Questions 
Although recent work has identified important aspects of how the mind-wandering state can 
inform our understanding of conscious experience, there are several important questions that 
remain unanswered:  
• What is the link between metacognition and mind-wandering? A number of 
studies (K. C. R. Fox & Christoff, 2014; Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 2011; Seli et al., 
2015) have shown that metacognitive awareness is implicated in the regulation of mind 
wandering and also in the capacity to report it effectively. It is also possible that the capacity 
to engage in self-generated thought in the first place is a metacognitive process. Experiencing 
thoughts about the future, for example, depends upon being aware of representations 
generated from stored knowledge and studies have shown that a similar network is implicated 
in this process as is involved in the effective meta cognition of information from memory 
(Baird, Mrazek, et al., 2014; Baird et al., 2013). This evidence suggests that the process of 
conscious attention to thoughts and feelings during the mind-wandering state may be 
inherently metacognitive in nature. 
• Neural substrates of stimulus independent aspects of consciousness. Is there a 
general neural substrate of stimulus-independency regardless of the content? The neural 
substrates for metacognition seem to be domain specific [58, 59]. Studies of brain 
organisation at rest suggest that most neural systems exhibit structured activity in the absence 
of an external task. These two lines of evidence suggest that stimulus independency may be a 
mode of cortical function rather than a property of a specific neural system. 
• The functions of stimulus independent cognition. Initial work exploring mind-
wandering focused on its negative role in on-going tasks such as reading (Franklin et al., 
2011; Reichle et al., 2010; Schooler et al., 2004). More recent work has demonstrated that 
there are beneficial aspects of the experience such as creativity and planning. Understanding 
the functional benefits that emerge from the mind-wandering state will be important in 
identifying the value that the stimulus independent aspect of conscious experience brings to 
the organism. 
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Figure 3.4 – Mind-Wandering Paradigm, Behavioral and fMRI Results: A) Participants alternate between a 0-
back task, which allows and induces mind-wandering, and a 1-back task, which requires constant on-task focus. B) 
Participants performing the easier, 0-back task, have higher accuracy, lower RTs, and are less on task, as measured 
through online thought-probes. C) Key areas of the default mode network are active during periods of 0-back task. 
Figure taken from (Konishi et al., 2015). 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
The experiences that emerge in the mind-wandering state illustrate that the contents of 
conscious experience can be dissociated from the environment within which it is embedded 
(stimulus independence) as well as underlining that we have introspective access to this aspect 
of experience (metacognition). Since it can be studied easily in the laboratory and in daily life, 
the mind-wandering state provides a paradigm in which consciousness can be understood in 
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an ecologically valid manner. Advances in experience sampling techniques have confirmed 
the heterogeneity of the mind-wandering state in terms of its functional outcomes while 
advances in neuroimaging have revealed the underlying mechanisms that support these 
aspects of experience. Importantly, the technique of triangulating between experiential and 
neurocognitive measures holds the promise of identifying covert markers that describe the 
contents of consciousness without relying solely on the introspective process. Building on 
these advances, the continuing development of our understanding of the mind-wandering state 
will illuminate how we escape the constraints of our immediate environment, and will help 
understand the functional role that conscious experience plays in our lives.     
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Chapter 4. The Default Mode Network Supports 
Cognition that Is Independent of Immediate 
Perceptual Input 
The following chapter has been adapted from: 
Konishi, M., McLaren, D. G., Engen, H., & Smallwood, J. (2015). Shaped by the past: the 
default mode network supports cognition that is independent of immediate perceptual input. 
PLoS One, 10(6), e0132209. 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Although many different accounts of the functions of the default mode network (DMN) have 
been proposed, few can adequately account for the spectrum of different cognitive functions 
that utilize this network. The current study used functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to explore the hypothesis that the role of the DMN in higher order cognition is to 
allow cognition to be shaped by information from stored representations rather than 
information in the immediate environment. Using a novel task paradigm, we observed 
increased BOLD activity in regions of the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex when individuals made decisions on the previous location of shapes (1-back), and 
decreased BOLD activity when individuals made decisions on the current location of shapes 
(0-back). These data are inconsistent with views of the DMN as a task-negative system or one 
that is sensitive only to stimuli with strong personal or emotional ties. Instead the involvement 
of the DMN when people make decisions about where a shape was, rather than where it is 
now, supports the hypothesis that the core hubs of the DMN allow cognition to be guided by 
information other than the immediate perceptual input. We propose that a variety of different 
forms of higher order thought (such as imagining the future or considering the perspective of 
another person) engage the DMN because these more complex introspective forms of higher 
order thought all depend on the capacity for cognition to be shaped by representations that are 
not present in the external environment. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Understanding the function of the default mode network (DMN) has become an important 
question in cognitive neuroscience (Buckner et al., 2008). This core brain network, focused on 
hubs in both the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
was initially identified via meta-analysis because of its tendency to deactivate during tasks 
that demand external focus (Raichle et al., 2001). Since then functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) has shown that these regions show patterns of temporally correlated activity 
during the resting state (Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003) and comparative studies 
have identified an analogue of the DMN in many species including rats (Lu et al., 2012), 
chimpanzees (Barks, Parr, & Rilling, 2013) and macaques (Mantini et al., 2011). 
Developmental studies have shown this network matures relatively late in life in humans (Fair 
et al., 2008) and degeneration within key structures of the DMN occurs with age and is 
particularly prevalent in dementias such as Alzheimer’s Disease (Jones et al., 2011; Mevel et 
al., 2011). 
 
Such evidence indicates that the DMN plays an important functional role in cognition 
(Buckner et al., 2008). Task based studies suggest the DMN is involved in a wide variety of 
cognitive functions including semantic processing (Binder & Desai, 2011), thinking about 
oneself (Kelley et al., 2002), imagining one’s future (Gaesser, Spreng, Mclelland, Addis, & 
Schacter, 2013; Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b), encoding and 
retrieving episodic memories (Huijbers et al., 2013), retrieving autobiographical memories (H. 
Kim, 2010; Philippi, Tranel, Duff, & Rudrauf, 2014), considering the world from the 
perspective of another person (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Schilbach, Eickhoff, 
Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008) and thinking creatively about a problem (Ellamil, 
Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012; Kuehn et al., 2014; Takeuchi et al., 2011) (for 
quantitative meta analyses see Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Spreng & 
Grady, 2009; Spreng & Mar, 2012; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). 
 
The large number of functions utilizing the DMN has generated several hypotheses of this 
networks function. For example, the association between DMN and states of personally 
relevant processing has led to the suggestion that it supports information important for the 
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autobiographical (Qin & Northoff, 2011) or social aspects of the self (Schilbach et al., 2008). 
The DMN has also been identified as important in task-irrelevant states such as mind 
wandering or daydreaming (Allen et al., 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; K. C. R. Fox et al., 2015; 
Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, Macrae, et al., 2007; McKiernan et al., 2006; 
Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011) and has been 
shown to lead to errors on tasks demanding external perception (Eichele et al., 2008). This 
latter point, coupled with the DMNs tendency to deactivate when performing such tasks 
(Raichle et al., 2001), has led some authors to describe it as a task negative network  (Bentley, 
Li, Snyder, Raichle, & Snyder, 2014; Fox et al., 2005; Landsiedel & Gilbert, 2014) (although 
see Spreng, 2012). Although the interpretations of the DMN as reflecting aspects of the self or 
as a task-negative system capture isolated aspects of the literature, they fail to provide an 
overarching account of the functions that this network performs. What is common, for 
example, to imaging the future or adopting another’s perspective and to deactivations during 
demanding perceptual tasks? 
 
One possibility is that the DMN allows cognition to process representations that are not 
presently available to the senses, an account we will refer to as the mnemonic facilitation 
hypothesis. Two recent studies support this basic premise. Smallwood and colleagues 
(Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013) used a paradigm in which individuals made decisions using 
information from past trials or from information available on that particular trial. They found 
that under conditions when individuals were asked to recollect details of the parity of 
numerical stimuli, regions of the medial pre-frontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex 
exhibited greater activity when this judgement was made rapidly rather than when it was 
made slowly. The opposite pattern was observed when decisions were made when the 
stimulus was available to perception. More recently, Spreng and colleagues (Spreng et al., 
2014) explored the neural recruitment that occurs when participants perform a working 
memory task containing famous and non-famous faces. They found that the core aspects of 
the DMN show enhanced activity in a two-back task when the target to be retrieved was a 
famous face, thus involving a combination of working memory and episodic memory. 
Together these two studies suggest that the role of the DMN in cognition is neither task-
negative nor related to personally significant information but may reflect a system that 
supports a wide range of psychological states that depend on representations that are not 
available to the senses. 
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If a primary function of the DMN was to allow representations unrelated to perceptual input to 
guide thought and behaviour this could also explain why it is implicated in states of 
imagination that rely on memorial input for their content (such as thinking about the past or 
the future). Guiding thoughts and actions based on memory is also unnecessary for tasks that 
rely on a continuous focus on perception, explaining why the DMN often deactivates in tasks 
as the Eriksen Flanker task or Go–No Go tasks and why, under these conditions, its activity 
can be a cause of error (Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Eichele et al., 2008; Li, 
Yan, Bergquist, & Sinha, 2007). The mnemonic facilitation hypothesis can also explain why 
aspects of the DMN are involved in semantic associative processes that depend on 
representations gained through experience (Binder & Desai, 2011) and why it exhibits 
activation when working memory targets are also encoded in long term memory (such as 
when they are a famous face; Spreng et al., 2014) . Importantly, it also explains the encoding-
retrieval flip phenomenon where the DMN deactivates during encoding and activates during 
retrieval (Huijbers et al., 2013). Relative to both the task-negative and autobiographical/social 
hypothesis, the mnemonic facilitation hypothesis leads to a simple prediction: regions of the 
DMN should be more engaged when a decision is made based on information represented in 
memory rather than immediate perceptual input. 
 
4.3 Current Study 
We developed a paradigm to test of our account of DMN function that builds on both our 
prior work and that of Spreng and colleagues. Participants alternate between task blocks in 
which they either make decisions about the location of shapes as they are presented on screen 
(0-back) or with respect to their location on the prior trial (1-back, see Figure 4.1). Engaging 
working memory reduces the occurrence of task unrelated thought (Mason, Norton, Van 
Horn, Wegner, Grafton, Macrae, et al., 2007; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, 
Ruby, et al., 2013; Teasdale et al., 1995). Based on prior studies, therefore, we expected to 
replicate an increase in off task thoughts in the 0-back task and to find greater sustained 
activity in the DMN during this period because of its documented role in cognition that is 
generated by the individual (Allen et al., 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason, Norton, Van 
Horn, Wegner, Grafton, Macrae, et al., 2007; McKiernan et al., 2006; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maquet, et al., 2011). 
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Figure 4.1 – Experimental Paradigm: Participants alternated between two tasks. One task involved observing 
non-coloured shapes presented at fixation waiting for the presentation of a coloured slide at which point they 
would indicate using a button press which side of the fixation cross a target shape was (0-back). In the other task 
participants had to encode the identity of shapes presented on screen and when prompted by a coloured slide to 
respond based on the position of a specific target shape on the prior trial (1-back). This paradigm requires 
participants to indicate the location of the same stimulus (for example the position of a square) which depends on 
whether the stimulus is immediately present or absent at the point at which the decision is made. 
 
Critical to the current investigation, however, is whether the DMN allows operations to be 
performed on previously acquired representations rather than that which is available to the 
senses. If it does, it should exhibit greater activity when decisions are made on the position of 
the shapes in the 1-back task relative to the 0-back task. Importantly because the judgment is 
regarding the spatial location of triangles, circles or squares, activation of the DMN under 
these conditions could not be attributed to the personal or emotional significance of the 
stimulus. Moreover, because the 1-back task is more demanding than the 0-back task, greater 
DMN activity in this context could not be accounted for by the task-negative hypothesis. 
Finally, because we manipulate whether the same stimulus is available to perception or not, 
we can rule out differences in the role of long-term memory (such as familiarity with a 
70 
 
famous face). To understand these questions, we conducted a behavioural experiment to 
confirm that our modulation of working memory reduced off task thought and an fMRI 
experiment to explore the mnemonic facilitation hypothesis of DMN function. 
 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Participants 
4.4.1.1 Behavioral 
Twenty-nine healthy participants (9 males, age = 21.7±2 years) completed the behavioural 
study. Participants were recruited using the Psychology Electronic Experiment Booking 
System (PEEBS) of the University of York. 
 
4.4.1.2 Task-based fMRI 
Twenty healthy, right-handed participants (9 males, age = 23.8±3 years) completed the fMRI 
study. Participants were recruited using both PEEBS and the York Neuroimaging Center 
(YNiC) participants’ pool. 
Both studies were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department of the 
University of York. All investigation was conducted according to the principles expressed in 
the Declaration of Helsinki and for both studies participants provided written informed 
consent. 
 
4.4.2 Task Paradigm 
4.4.2.1 Behavioural 
The task used in this experiment was programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). The task 
featured a 0-back and a 1-back condition that continuously switched from one another 
throughout the experimental session (see Figure 4.1). Our paradigm is broadly similar to the 
paradigm used by Smallwood and colleagues (Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013) and was 
modified with the specific aim of maximising the differences between the 0-back and the 1-
back conditions. In both conditions participants saw different pairs of shapes (Non-Targets, 
NT) appearing on the screen divided by a vertical line; the pairs could be: a circle and a 
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square, a circle and a triangle, or a square and a triangle for a total of 6 possible pairs (two 
different left/right configurations for each). The pairs never had shapes of the same kind (e.g. 
a square and a square). In both tasks, a block of NT was followed by target requiring 
participants to make a manual response. The target was a small stimulus presented in either 
blue or red and the colour was counterbalanced across participants. In the 0-back condition the 
target was flanked by one of two shapes and participants had to indicate by pressing the 
appropriate button which shape matched the target shape. In the 1-back condition, the target 
was flanked by two question marks and participants had to respond depending on which side 
the target shape was on the prior trial. For the behavioural study responses were made using 
the left and right arrow keys, for the neuroimaging study responses were made using a button 
box. Importantly, unlike the paradigm employed by Smallwood and colleagues (Smallwood, 
Tipper, et al., 2013) this design ensures that the participants cannot know what response to 
make when presented with the to be encoded stimulus. 
Each block lasted between 40 to 120 seconds before switching to the other condition; the 
change of condition was signalled by a message (“SWITCH”) that remained on screen for 5 
seconds. On each trial the number of NTs preceding the Targets varied between 2 and 6, the 
number of trials per block varied between 2 and 5 and the total number of blocks was 8 for 
each condition. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants and the 
whole task lasted ~35 minutes. The total number of targets was 15 to 20 per condition (0-back 
and 1-back). Also, in every block the word “STAY” was presented at the end of a trial 
indicating that participants were to remain in that condition. In order to sample the 
participants’ ongoing experiences we used a probe-caught, experience sampling method 
(Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004b; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).The 
task was built so that there was a 50% chance of a thought probe being presented in place of a 
Target in a condition block and a maximum of one probe per condition block was allowed. 
The thought probe consisted in a screen prompting the participants to rate their focus level 
(“Where you focused on the task or were you thinking about something else?”) on a scale 
from 0 (completely off task) to 9 (completely on task). 
Presentation rate of the stimuli was jittered in the following way. Fixation crosses ranged 
from 2–4 seconds in steps of 0.1s, Non-targets were varied from 1–3 seconds in steps of 0.1s. 
Targets always lasted a maximum of 4 seconds and a response from participants immediately 
ended the target presentation. 
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4.4.2.2 Task-based fMRI data acquisition 
The paradigm used for the fMRI study was essentially the same with the following changes: 
there were no thought probes presented, fixation crosses were jittered between 2–3 seconds in 
steps of 0.1s, non-targets were jittered between 1–2 seconds in steps of 0.1s, targets stayed on 
the screen for 2.5 seconds regardless of a response being made by participants, switches and 
stay screens lasted 4 seconds, responses were made using an MRI compatible button box. The 
total number of blocks was 6 per condition in each run and the total number of targets was 8 
to 12 per condition (0-back and 1-back) in each run, making it 12 blocks and 16 to 24 targets 
per condition in total. 
Imaging was performed at the York Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) using a GE 3.0 Tesla HDx 
Excite MRI scanner using an 8-channel head coil. Functional data were acquired using a T2*-
weighted gradient echo planar imaging sequence with the following parameters: 32 
interleaved axial slices, repetition time = 2000ms, echo time = 30ms, flip angle = 90°, slice 
thickness = 3mm, field of view = 192x192, matrix 64x64). The first 10 time points were 
removed to allow magnetization equilibrium. T1-weighted scans were acquired to confirm no 
participants had brain abnormalities and for normalization with the following parameters: 
repetition time = 7.8ms, echo time = 3ms, flip angle = 20°, slice thickness = 1.13 x 1.13 x 1.0 
mm, field of view = 290 x 290 x 176, matrix = 256 x 256 x 176. The scanning session 
involved a 7 minute resting state scan (eyes open, fixating on a black cross on grey 
background) followed by two task runs each lasting approximately 15 minutes. Between the 
two sessions participants were given a short break. Finally, we recorded a 7 minute structural 
scan. 
 
4.4.3 Pre-processing 
4.4.3.1 Task-based fMRI 
Pre-processing of the task based fMRI data was performed using Statistical Parametric 
Mapping (SPM8; Penny, Friston, Ashburner, Kiebel, & Nichols, 2011; available at: 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8) implemented in Matlab R 2013a (The 
Mathworks Inc.; available at: http://www.mathworks.com). Data underwent the following 
processing steps: (1) slice-time correction, (2) motion correction, (3) co-registration of the T1-
weighted image to the mean EPI scans, (4) normalized to MNI space using the T1-weighted 
normalization parameters computed during unified segmentation, (5) resampled to 2mm 
isotropic voxels, and (6) smoothed using a 6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
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4.4.3.2 Resting state fMRI 
Pre-processing of the resting state data used the DPARSF v2.3 toolbox (Chao-Gan & Yu-
Feng, 2010) implemented in Matlab R 2013a. Data underwent the following processing steps: 
(1) slice-time correction, (2) motion correction, (3) co-registered the T1-weighted image to 
the mean functional image, (4) normalized to MNI space using the T1-weighted normalization 
parameters computed during New Segment and DARTEL, (5) resampled to 2mm isotropic 
voxels, and (6) smoothed using a 6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, (7) nuisance regression using 
the six movement parameters, the signal from the the white matter and the signal from the 
CSF, and (8) band-pass filtered .008 to .01Hz. 
 
4.4.4 First Level Analysis 
4.4.4.1 Task-based fMRI 
To analyse our mixed block-event related design (see Figure 4.2) (Fair et al., 2007; Petersen 
& Dubis, 2012), we employed a GLM to model each event type. The transient events in each 
task (targets, switches and stays) were modelled as single events with the relevant duration in 
seconds (2, 4 and 4 respectively). The sustained activity in each task was modelled by creating 
a block that began at the first NT in each block and lasted until the participant switched to the 
other task. Each of these events was convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
function as implemented in SPM 8. The GLMs included a constant term per run, a high 
frequency signal filtering (cut off = 128 s), an AR(1) filter and the motion parameters. For 
each individual we computed two contrast images: (1) 1-back greater than 0-back sustained 
responses and (2) 1-back greater than 0-back target transient responses. 
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Figure 4.2 – Analytic strategy: The task-based data was analysed using a mixed block / event design. We 
modelled transient events in both tasks as single event with a length equivalent to the stimulus duration. To model 
the sustained changes that occur during each task block we created a box-car that began at the beginning of the task 
block and lasted until the participant received the instruction to switch to the other task. 
 
4.4.4.2 Resting state fMRI 
To provide a quantitative description of the spatial extent of the DMN we calculated the 
functional connectivity of the PCC region using the resting state scans acquired as part of this 
study. We calculated the time series of two 6mm diameter spheres centred on the co-ordinates 
of the PCC [–8, –52, 26] in each hemisphere reported by Andrews-Hanna et al. (Andrews-
Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, et al., 2010) and used these as regressors in a standard functional 
connectivity analysis implemented using the DPARSF toolbox for SPM. Correlation 
coefficients were then transformed to Z-scores using Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation for group 
level analyses. 
 
4.4.5 Group Level Analysis 
4.4.5.1 Task-based fMRI 
One-sample t-tests were used to evaluate the differences in 1-back and 0-back BOLD 
responses for transient and sustained events separately. Results were masked with the grey 
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matter mask provided by DPARSF. We used a voxel wise threshold of p < 0.01 and 
topological False Discovery Rate with a p-value of p < 0.05 as implemented in SPM to 
control for multiple comparisons. 
 
4.4.5.2 Resting state fMRI 
A one-sample t-test was used to determine the extent of the DMN. The subsequent images 
were thresholded with a T of 7 and binarised. This was used as a mask for analysis of the task 
based data. 
 
4.4.5.3 Conjunction analysis 
One-sample t-tests were used for the transient and sustained events on the 1-back and 0-back 
conditions using a cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.05. We then calculated the overlap 
between the resulting maps and masked them with the DMN mask obtained from the resting-
state analysis. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Behavioural 
We analysed accuracy and response time data for both the behavioural and neuroimaging 
samples using paired sample t-tests. These demonstrated that participants were both slower 
and less accurate in the 1-back than in the 0-back task in both experiments (behavioural RTs: t 
(25) = 3.75, p < 0.001; behavioural accuracy: t (25) = -4.92, p < 0.001; fMRI RTs: t (19) = 
6.70, p < 0.001; fMRI accuracy: t (19) = 2.38, p = 0.03; see Figure 4.3 A and Figure 4.3 B). In 
addition analysis of the experience sampling reports collected in the behavioural study 
indicated that participants rated their experience as reflecting greater off task thought in the 0-
back than the 1-back task (t (25) = 2.45, p = 0.02; Figure 4.3 C). 
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Figure 4.3 - Behavioral results: Analysis of the behavioural data collected during both the behavioural (top three 
graphs) and fMRI (bottom two graphs) experiment indicated that participants were both faster (shown in ms) and 
more accurate when they were asked to make decisions about the location of a shape based on the present trial 
relative to where it was on the previous trial. In addition, analysis of the experience sampling data recorded in the 
behavioural experiment (top right graph), demonstrated that participants engaged in more off task thought during 
the 0-back than the 1-back task: participants rated their task focus on a scale from 0 (completely off task) to 9 
(completely on task). The mean of participants’ responses to the probes in each condition is shown. ** p < 0.001, * 
p < 0.05. 
 
4.5.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
4.5.2.1 Whole brain analysis–Transient activity 
We identified a large set of regions that were significantly more activated for correct 
responses to the targets in the 1-back task than the 0-back task (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4). 
These included regions traditionally associated with working memory including the anterior 
cingulate cortex, the anterior insula (bilaterally), inferior parietal sulcus (IPS) and regions of 
the lateral pre-frontal cortex (bilaterally). To ascertain whether this pattern of activity is 
consistently observed in working memory tasks we explored the overlap between our findings 
and those observed in a meta-analysis of studies involving the term working memory using 
Neurosynth (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). We saw overlaps in 
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regions of mid cingulate cortex as well as dorsal regions of lateral pre-frontal and parietal 
cortex. This information is presented as a sub panel in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Whole brain analyses: We conducted a whole brain analysis of the observed transient and sustained 
changes in the BOLD signal. Row A): Yellow areas show sustained activation for the 0-back task. Row B): Blue 
areas show transient activation for the 1-back task. Importantly regions of both the medial prefrontal cortex and the 
posterior cingulate cortex exhibited greater activity during target retrieval in the 1-back task (B) and increased 
sustained activity in the 0-back condition (A). These images were created using a cluster forming threshold of p < 
.01 and multiple comparisons were controlled for using topological FDR (p < .05). Subpanel C) on the bottom-
right shows the overlap in frontal and posterior dorsal regions between the transient activation for the 1-back task 
(light blue) and a meta-analysis using the term “working memory” using Neurosynth (dark blue). 
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Table 4.1 – Transient activity: Regions showing increased transient BOLD activity during correct responding in 
the 1-Back > 0 Back task. 
 
More relevant to the current investigation was the enhanced activity for targets in the 1-back 
task that extended into regions of the core DMN including the PCC and mPFC (Figure 4.4). 
We found no region exhibiting activity surpassing the cluster-forming threshold for the 
opposite contrast (0-back > 1-back). 
 
4.5.2.2 Whole brain analysis–Sustained activity 
The easier 0-back task activated areas of the DMN to a greater extent than in the harder 1-
back task (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.4). These included anterior and posterior regions of the 
mPFC and the PCC, as well as regions in the temporal parietal junction and the lateral 
temporal lobes. Activity was also enhanced in the several sub-cortical structures including the 
caudate / putamen, thalamus, hippocampus. We found no region exhibiting activity surpassing 
the cluster-forming threshold for the opposite contrast (1-back > 0-back). 
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Table 4.2 - Sustained activity: Areas showing greater sustained BOLD activity in the O-Back than 1-Back blocks. 
 
4.5.2.3 DMN Region of interest analysis 
We repeated the one-sample t-tests reported above using our mask of the DMN (see Figure 
4.5). We found that regions of the precuneus (Prec), the PCC, the mPFC and regions of the 
right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) exhibited greater transient activity for correct 
responses to the 1-back than the 0-back targets (see Figure 4.5). Similarly, regions of the 
PCC, the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the left middle temporal gyrus (L. MTG) and the 
hippocampus (Hipp.) exhibited greater sustained activity in the 0-back than the 1-back task 
(see Fig 6). To demonstrate that these transient and sustained changes constitute increases in 
the BOLD signal we extracted beta weights from each cluster using the rfxplot toolbox for 
SPM (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.5 - Transient changes with the Default mode network: We repeated the analysis using a mask of the 
DMN created using functional connectivity from a sample of 39 healthy participants. This analysis revealed 
clusters in the posterior cingulate cortex, regions of the ventral and dorso-medial pre-frontal cortex and the right 
tempo parietal junction. To identify whether these clusters of activity constituted increases in activity in the 1-back 
task we extracted the beta weights for each and plotted the group averages. These images were created using a 
cluster forming threshold of p < .01 and multiple comparisons were controlled for using topological FDR (p < .05). 
The image used as a mask is presented in the sub-panel. 
 
81 
 
 
Figure 4.6 - Sustained changes within the Default mode network: To identify which patterns of increased 
sustained activity in the 0-back task observed in the whole brain analysis we repeated the analysis using a mask of 
the DMN created using functional connectivity from a sample of 39 healthy participants. This analysis revealed 
clusters in the posterior cingulate cortex, the left hippocampus, the left middle temporal gyrus and the right tempo 
parietal junction. To identify whether these clusters of activity constituted increases in sustained activity in the 0-
back task we extracted the beta weights for each and plotted the group averages. These images were created using a 
cluster forming threshold of p < .01 and multiple comparisons were controlled for using topological FDR (p < .05). 
The images used as masks are presented in the sub-panel. 
 
4.5.2.4 Conjunction analysis 
Finally, we explored the spatial similarities in the sustained and transient changes in the DMN 
by examining their spatial conjunction. As the logic of conjunction of temporally different 
events is a relatively stringent statistical test we used a liberal cluster-forming threshold of p < 
0.05 to rule out a Type II error. We calculated the overlap between the whole brain analysis of 
transient increases in the 1-Back task and the sustained increases in the 0-back condition using 
this liberal threshold. This image was masked by the DMN mask generated from the resting-
state fMRI study. This analysis revealed patterns of cluster corrected sustained activity in the 
0-back task and of target related activity in the 1-back task, which overlapped in a region of 
the PCC / retrosplenial cortex and in the mPFC (see Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7 - Spatial conjunction analysis: To formally compare the activations arising from the sustained and 
transient increases in DMN activity observed in this experiment we created whole brain images for the Targets (1-
back > 0-back) and the Blocks (0-back > 1-back). This analysis used a cluster forming threshold of p < .05 
controlling for multiple comparisons using FDR (p < .05). These images were binarised and we calculated their 
overlap with each other as well as the DMN mask used in the prior analyses using ImCalc function of SPM. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
Using fMRI during performance of our working memory task, we found brain activity in 
working memory regions when participants performed a 1-back rather than a 0-back task, 
confirming previous findings. Importantly, however, these regions were accompanied by 
activity in regions within the mPFC and PCC corresponding to core hubs of the DMN. These 
results are inconsistent with at least two prevalent views of the functions of this network. 
Regions of mPFC and PCC increased activity when making a decision about a shapes position 
from memory and decreased activity when making the same decision using immediate 
perceptual input. As deciding where a shape was is more difficult than deciding where a shape 
is, the patterns of activation and deactivation of the mPFC and PCC in the more demanding 1-
bask task indicates that this activity is not a task deactivation (M. D. Fox et al., 2005). 
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Furthermore, the relative activation of the mPFC and PCC by decisions regarding the position 
of a shape demonstrates that strong emotive or autobiographical ties with a stimulus are not 
necessary to activate these regions (Spreng & Grady, 2009). Nor must the stimulus be 
encoded in long-term memory (Spreng et al., 2014) as is the case for a famous face: our study 
shows that this capacity to guide cognition based on information from memory is not 
equivalent to long–term memory because the core of the DMN was activated when decisions 
were made based on representations of information that was presented a matter of seconds 
ago. Instead these data can simply be accounted for by the mnemonic facilitation hypothesis: 
that core regions of the DMN allow cognitive operations to be guided by information 
unrelated to immediate perceptual input. 
 
Further support for our hypothesis comes from the observation that overlapping regions of the 
PCC and mPFC exhibited sustained activity in the 0-back task as well as transient target 
related activity in 1-back task. Our experience exampling study confirmed that the 0-back task 
was characterized by greater off task thought (see Figure 4.3) making it possible that the 
pattern of activity seen in both the PCC and mPFC may indicate a common role for these 
regions in allowing cognition the freedom to perform operations that are not constrained by 
immediate input whether it is to do with the momentary demands of a task or not. Without 
direct evidence linking DMN activity in the task to the experiences reported by the 
participants, this interpretation should be treated with caution; however, we hope to test this 
hypothesis in a larger sample of participants with online measures of self-generated thought in 
the future. 
 
Our hypothesis that the DMN allows thought and behaviour to be guided by memory explains 
why this network is prominent in a range of higher order cognitive states such as future 
thinking, mentalizing or creativity, as well as task irrelevant activities such as daydreaming or 
mind wandering. All of these states depend on being able to consider information from 
memory, often to the extent that this can be detrimental to perceptual processing (as in the 
case of mind-wandering, (Baird, Smallwood, et al., 2014; Kam et al., 2010; Smallwood, 
Beach, et al., 2008). Our hypothesis that the DMN allows thought to be shaped by 
representations from memory also explains why this network has an analogue in a wide range 
of non-human species. While it is a matter of debate whether complex abilities like mental 
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time travel or language are unique to humans (Suddendorf & Busby, 2003), the capacity to 
guide behaviour using information from memory is a universal feature of mammalian 
cognition. As our data suggests that the DMN can support relatively mundane cognitive 
processes in humans (“Which side was the triangle on?”) it seems that the presence of 
analogues for this network in different species may simply reflect the fact that they are also 
capable of guiding behaviour based on information other than immediate perceptual input. 
 
Our hypothesis gains further support from work showing that perceptual input and DMN 
activity are often in opposition (Huijbers et al., 2013; Sperling et al., 2010; Vannini et al., 
2012). For example, the recent work of Huijbers and colleagues (Huijbers et al., 2013) 
showing DMN increases in episodic memory retrieval and decreases during episodic memory 
encoding. This suppression of the DMN during encoding is consistent with the reduction in 
sustained activity we observe in the 1-back task because under these conditions participants 
must continually encode information from the environment. Our hypothesis also predicts that 
changes in the value of immediate input for a specific stimulus or task will be associated with 
increased activity in the DMN. This prediction is supported by a recent study of repetition 
suppression, which observed decreases in DMN deactivations during encoding as participants 
viewed the same items, suggest that the DMN deactivates less as participants form a stronger 
memory trace of a stimulus (Vannini et al., 2012). 
 
When participants made decisions in the 1-back task we also observed increased activity in 
cortical regions outside of the DMN. For example, we found increased activity in the DLPFC 
and IPS: both elements of the fronto-parietal network (FPN (Coull, Frith, Frackowiak, & 
Grasby, 1996; Duncan, 2010)). BOLD increases during 1-back decisions were also observed 
in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate, regions which are important in the cingular-
opercular, or saliency network (Seeley et al., 2007). Variations on this pattern of network 
activity has been observed when participants make plans for their future (Gerlach, Spreng, 
Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Gerlach, Spreng, Madore, & Schacter, 2013; Spreng, Stevens, 
Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010), engage in creative thought (Ellamil et al., 2012), 
resist future rewards in the service of greater long term return (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 
2011), and when maintaining social information in memory (Meyer, Spunt, Berkman, Taylor, 
& Lieberman, 2012). Most recently, Spreng and colleagues demonstrated that the DMN and 
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the FPN co-operate to perform a working memory task with famous faces as the target 
(Spreng et al., 2014). Our study, therefore, adds to a growing body of research that 
demonstrates that many complex higher order tasks cannot be attributed to a single neural 
network and instead depend on the coordinated activity of multiple networks in a flexible 
fashion (for further discussion see (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012; Schacter, 2012; 
Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012; Spreng, 2012). 
 
Our data demonstrate that core regions of the DMN are activated when participants are asked 
where a shape was rather than where it is right now. A simple account of these data is that it 
reflects the role of the DMN in allowing cognition to be shaped by representations that are 
distinct from those provided by immediate perceptual input. We propose this process is 
necessary for a range of different functions including task judgements that depend on 
recollections based on memory but also daydreams about a holiday or ruminations about a 
personal problem, thus accounting in a parsimonious manner for many of the functions that 
utilize the DMN. While this hypothesis is important because it offers an account for why the 
DMN is common to seemingly disparate functions, it offers no explanation for how these 
functions are differentiated within the DMN, nor the precise mechanisms that allow behaviour 
to be guided by information that is represented internally rather in the external environment. 
Moving forward it is likely we will need more sophisticated models of the cognitive functions 
that the DMN supports, as well as more comprehensive accounts of the functions that 
different regions perform, in order to truly understand the complex role this network plays in 
human cognition. 
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Chapter 5. Pupillometric Signatures of 
Fluctuations in External Attention 
The following chapter has been adapted from: 
Konishi, M., Brown, K., Battaglini, L., & Smallwood, J. (2017). When attention wanders: 
Pupillometric signatures of fluctuations in external attention. Cognition, 168, 16-26. 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Attention is not always directed to events in the external environment. On occasion our 
thoughts wander to people and places distant from the here and now. Sometimes, this lack of 
external attention can compromise ongoing task performance. In the current study we set out 
to understand the extent to which states of internal and external attention can be determined 
using pupillometry as an index of ongoing cognition. In two experiments we found that 
periods of slow responding were associated with elevations in the baseline pupil signal over 
three and a half seconds prior to a behavioural response. In the second experiment we found 
that unlike behavioural lapses, states of off-task thought, particularly those associated with a 
focus on the past and with an intrusive quality, were associated with reductions in the size of 
the pupil over the same window prior to the probe. These data show that both states of large 
and small baseline pupil size are linked to states when attention is not effectively focused on 
the external environment, although these states have different qualities. More generally, these 
findings illustrate that subjective and objective markers of task performance may not be 
equivalent and underscore the importance of developing objective indicators that can allow 
these different states to be understood. 
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5.2 Introduction 
Attention is not always focused on the external environment; experiences like mind-
wandering and daydreaming illustrate situations when cognition is generated based on our 
factual knowledge of the world, and episodic memories about the people we know and the 
places we have visited over the course of our lives (Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood et al., 
2016a; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Although we now know that these experiences make 
contributions to our well-being (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Poerio et al., 2013), can arise 
either intentionally or spontaneously (Seli et al., 2016), and can compromise ongoing 
performance (Mcvay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2008), the intrinsic nature of these 
experiences has hindered our capacity to understand their contributions to the human 
condition. 
One barrier to the investigation of self-generated states is a reliance on measures of self-
report. Introspective evidence allows the internal landscape of personal experience to be 
described, and participants have been shown to be reliable assessors of their task focus 
(Mittner et al., 2016; Seli et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the requirement that participants must 
explicitly reflect on the contents of their experience makes it possible that results that are 
generated in this fashion may alter the nature of the experiences that are being investigated 
(Konishi & Smallwood, 2016). One way to understand, and ultimately overcome, these issues, 
is through the development of indirect markers that could be used as a proximal measure for 
the occurrence of self-generated thoughts. The current study attempts to address this issue 
using pupillometry as a covert marker for ongoing cognitive processing. 
Prior studies have found that when the baseline diameter of pupils is unusually small or large, 
attention is not always effectively focused on the external environment. For example, 
momentary lapses in attention, as indexed by slow response times or errors in performance, 
are preceded by periods of both large and small baseline pupil size (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Van 
Den Brink, Murphy, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016; Smallwood et al., 2011, 2012; Van Orden et al., 
2000). A similar pattern has been observed across studies of mind-wandering, with some 
finding increased pupil diameter co-occurring with self-reports of off task/mind-wandering 
episodes (Franklin, Broadway, et al., 2013), while others have found the reverse (Grandchamp 
et al., 2014). A more recent study (Unsworth & Robison, 2016), which differentiated between 
types of off task states, found increased baseline pupil size before reports of external 
distraction and reduced pupil size before both reports of mind wandering episodes and 
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inattentiveness.  It is widely accepted that pupillometry provides an indirect measure of 
arousal and of locus coeruleus (LC) activity (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Morad et al., 2000; 
Murphy et al., 2011; Stanners et al., 1979; Wilhelm et al., 1998; Yoss et al., 1970), and that 
arousal/LC activity have a known relation to performance and attention (Aston-Jones et al., 
1999; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), with extreme levels of arousal linked to drowsiness or high 
distractibility. Moreover, catecholamines such as noradrenaline, which are linked to the LC, 
are thought to adjust the gain on neural processing across the cortex, and at moderate levels 
help gate sensory processing in a goal related manner and thus ensuring cognitive and 
behavioural stability (Hauser et al., 2016). It thus seems plausible that states of optimal focus 
may be indicated by moderate levels of arousal, with extremely large or small pupils 
indicating situations when attention is not engaged with the external environment to the same 
degree (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). Moreover, the pupil 
signal may provide important descriptive information on how the mind shifts between these 
states (Hauser et al., 2016; Mittner et al., 2016a). 
It has been suggested that understanding the relationship between self-generated thought and 
other aspects of neurocognitive functioning can depend on the content of individuals’ 
experiences (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). For example, studies have found that 
when experience is focused on events from the past, this is often associated with lower levels 
of happiness (Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). By 
contrast, thoughts about the future, but not the past, have been linked to reductions in levels of 
social stress (Engert et al., 2014) and may contribute to the processes through which people 
consolidate personal goals (Medea et al., 2016). Neurocognitive investigations have also 
highlighted differences between these classes of experiences. Self-generated thoughts about 
the past were linked to higher connectivity between lateral temporal lobe regions and the 
hippocampus, reflecting the heightened role of episodic memory when we retrospect, and 
relatively greater decoupling between medial prefrontal cortex and medial visual cortex than 
for individuals who tend to think more about the future (Smallwood et al., 2016a). Together, 
these observations support the hypothesis that the content of self-generated thought in part 
determines its relationship to other neurocognitive measures. 
As well as taking into account the content of self-generated thought, it is important to consider 
the context in which self-generated thought occurs (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). 
Studies have shown that, although participants’ executive control capacity relates to lower 
levels of off-task thought when tasks are complex (Mcvay & Kane, 2009; Unsworth & 
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Robison, 2016), the relationship can reverse when tasks are less demanding (Bernhardt et al., 
2014; Kane et al., 2007; Levinson et al., 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Smallwood et al., 
2013). Indeed, task demands modulate different types of off-task thought, with a focus on the 
future more common in easy tasks (Ruby et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009). Under these 
conditions mind-wandering is described as more intentional (Seli et al., 2016; Seli et al., 
2016b), and is less likely to be detrimental to task performance (Thomson et al., 2014). It is 
often assumed that self-generated thought is more common during tasks that lack complex 
demands (Teasdale et al., 1993) because there is a greater availability of cognitive resources 
to devote to self-generated thought. Together these lines of evidence suggest that 
understanding the context in which self-generated occurs can be important in understanding 
its neurocognitive basis. 
The current study aims to elucidate the relationship between pupil diameter and the extent to 
which attention is deployed to the external environment. We measured pupil diameter in the 
context of a paradigm in which we manipulated the degree of external task focus by means of 
the addition of a working memory load (see Figure 5.1). We have previously used this 
paradigm to vary the amount of attention that participants devote to an ongoing task, a 
manipulation that is reflected in the speed and effectiveness with which decisions are made, as 
well as in changes in reports of task focus. In a prior study we acquired functional magnetic 
resonance imaging data during this task and found that performance of the easy task is 
accompanied by greater engagement of regions of the default mode network (Konishi et al., 
2015), a neural system important in self-generated thought (Allen et al., 2013; Christoff, 
Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-
Hanna, 2016; Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Mason et al., 2007; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011). 
Using this paradigm, we conducted two experiments on healthy participants in which we 
acquired measures of pupil diameter while they performed alternating blocks of the 0-back 
and 1-back versions of this paradigm. We acquired two different indicators of the focus of 
attention. In Experiment 1 we acquired measures of behavioural task performance, and in 
Experiment 2 we also measured the content of ongoing thought using Multi-Dimensional 
Experience Sampling (MDES; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2016; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood 
et al., 2016b; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). We measured both subjective and objective 
indicators of attention to explore whether they had the same signature in terms of baseline 
pupil size. Our motivation for measuring subjective indicators of attention only in the second 
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experiment was to address the concern that the act of introspecting on experience would alter 
the nature of any pupil-behaviour relationships observed in the first experiment.  
Although we also examined evoked responses in the pupil signal, the primary focus of our 
analysis was baseline pupil diameter, given prior work indicating that this measure provides 
an index of whole brain neural gain that describes the stability of cognition at a given moment 
(Hauser et al., 2016; Mittner et al., 2016a). Importantly, while the content of mind wandering 
episodes has been investigated with behavioural and fMRI measures (Gorgolewski et al., 
2014; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2016; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016a), previous 
pupillometric studies only differentiated between states of on-task or off-task (or within off-
task states, such as mind wandering or external distraction), but did not explore content-
related questions (e.g. Franklin et al., 2013; Grandchamp et al., 2014; Smallwood et al., 2011; 
Unsworth & Robison, 2016). Given evidence of neural differences associated with different 
forms of content during mind-wandering, we sought to re-evaluate the links between on-going 
experience and the pupil signal to explore which aspects of experiential content it reflects. In 
this way, our study is the first to explore the hypothesis that physiological changes may 
underpin differences within the content of experience during the mind-wandering state. 
Finally, we also explored whether any relationship between the pupil signal and on-going 
experience depends the nature of the external task to identify if the pupil marker can provide 
an index of attention in a manner that is independent of the context within which it is 
assessed. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Task Paradigm 
The task used in both studies was programmed using PsychoPy2 (Peirce, 2007, 2008). The 
task featured a 0-back and a 1-back condition that continuously switched from one to the other 
throughout the experimental session (see Figure 5.1). Our paradigm is the same used in 
Konishi et al. (2015). In both conditions participants saw different pairs of shapes (Non-
Targets, NT) appearing on the screen divided by a vertical line. The shape pairs could be: a 
circle and a square, a circle and a triangle, or a square and a triangle for a total of 6 possible 
pairs (two different left/right configurations for each). The pairs never had shapes of the same 
kind (e.g. a square and a square). In both tasks, a block of NT was followed by a target 
requiring participants to make a manual response. The target was a small stimulus presented 
in either blue or red. In the 0-back condition the target was flanked by one of two shapes and 
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participants had to indicate by pressing the appropriate button which shape matched the target 
shape. In the 1-back condition, the target was flanked by two question marks and participants 
had to respond using the left and right arrow keys, depending on which side the target shape 
was on the previous trial. 
 
Each block lasted between 40 to 120 seconds before switching to the other condition; the 
change of condition was signaled by a message (“SWITCH”) that remained on screen for 4 
seconds. The number of NTs preceding the targets varied between 2 and 6, the number of 
targets per block varied between 2 and 5 and the total number of blocks was 8 for each 
condition. The total number of targets was 15 to 20 per condition. The blue and red colours 
used in the two conditions were matched for luminance as displayed on an LCD monitor, and 
the colour/condition pairing was counterbalanced across participants. The starting order of 
conditions was counterbalanced across participants and a single session of the task lasted ~15 
minutes for Experiment 1 and ~20 minutes for Experiment 2 (due to the addition of thought 
probes). Each participant completed two sessions for study 1, and two to six sessions in the 
span of three different days (two sessions a day) for study 2. Presentation rate of the stimuli 
was jittered in the following way: fixation crosses ranged from 1.8-2.2 seconds (average 2s) in 
steps of 0.05s, Non-targets were varied from 1.3–1.7 seconds (average 1.5s) in steps of 0.05s. 
Target durations ranged from 2.1-2.5 seconds (average 2.3s) in steps of 0.05s and lasted for 
the full duration, regardless of participant response.  
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Figure 5.1 - Top panel illustrates our paradigm: in both conditions, after a certain number of Non-Targets (NTs) 
participants were faced with a target decision (in Experiment 1 & 2), or a thought probe (only in Experiment 2). In 
the 0-back condition, the decision is based on the presently perceived stimulus (is the square on the left or the 
right?); the NTs are thus irrelevant to the task, allowing for long periods in the 0-back condition when attention is 
unconstrained by the ongoing task. Conversely, in the 1-back condition the target decision is based on the 
previously attended NT (was the square on the left or the right?).  Under these conditions, participants must 
maintain external attention on the NTs in order to perform accurately in the task. We selected a time window of 
~3.5 seconds, corresponding to the NT and fixation cross immediately preceding a target or a thought probe, to 
analyse the effects of average pupil size on behaviour and internal reports. Bottom grey panel shows how our 
conditions modulate behaviour and on-task reports. In both studies participants are slower and less accurate in the 
1-back condition; additionally, their pupils are larger and they report being more on-task. 
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5.3.2 Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling (Experiment 2) 
In order to sample participants’ ongoing experiences in Experiment 2, we used a probe-
caught, experience sampling method (Kahneman et al., 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
The task was designed so that there was a 20% chance of a thought probe being presented in 
place of a Target in a condition block. The experience sampling protocol consisted of a series 
of ten questions (shown in Table 5.1), the first of which always prompted participants to rate 
their focus level (“Just before this question appeared, were you focused on the task or were 
you thinking about something else?”) on a continuous slider scale from “completely off task” 
to “completely on task”. Before the experiment began, participants were instructed on the 
meaning of being completely on task (e.g. “I’m focused and only thinking about the computer 
task”) and completely off task (e.g. “I was thinking about something unrelated, like a past 
vacation or what I’ll have for dinner”). The other nine questions were split into five questions 
regarding the content, and four questions regarding the form of the thoughts experienced by 
the participants. Participants answered using a slider scale that always had “not at all” and 
“completely” at the extremes, apart from one question regarding the thoughts’ valence, for 
which the scale went from “negative” to “positive”. These questions have been used in 
previous investigations (Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016a). 
 
Type Question Dimension Left 
Extreme 
Right 
Extreme 
Content My thoughts were focused on the 
task I was performing.  
Focus Not at all Completely 
Content My thoughts involved other 
people. 
Other Not at all Completely 
Content The content of my thoughts was: Emotion Negative Positive 
Content My thoughts involved past events. Past Not at all Completely 
Content My thoughts involved myself. Self Not at all Completely 
Content My thoughts involved future 
events. 
Future Not at all Completely 
Form My thoughts were in the form of 
words. 
Words Not at all Completely 
Form My thoughts were in the form of 
images. 
Images Not at all Completely 
Form My thoughts were vague and non-
specific. 
Vague Not at all Completely 
Form My thoughts were intrusive. Intrusive Not at all Completely 
 
Table 5.1 - The table shows the questions asked to participants for each thought probe. The first question always 
regarded their on-task focus level, while the other 9 were randomised each time. Participants responded on a 
continuous scale which had a left and a right extreme for each question, as described in the table. 
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Mind wandering episodes are rich, heterogeneous phenomena in content and form 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). One way to capture the variety and heterogeneity of 
each episode is to conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) to determine patterns of 
covariance in the participants’ responses to the thought probes (e.g. when participants think 
about the past, they might also tend to think about themselves and in the form of images). 
Factor analyses have been previously used with success in a range of mind wandering studies 
(Klinger & Cox, 1987; Medea et al., 2016; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2016a; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). 
In the current study, as in our prior work, we differentiate between the immediate content of 
experience (e.g. whether it is related to the task, its episodic or emotional features), from the 
form that these thoughts are expressed (e.g. whether these experiences are intrusive, expressed 
as images or words). We recorded a total of 673 thought probes. Following Medea et al. 
(2016), Ruby et al. (2013a), Ruby et al. (2013b), Smallwood et al. (2016), we decomposed 
these data at the trial level using exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation and 
selected three components for both the content questions and three components for the form 
questions which explained ~80 % of the variance in both cases. These are presented in Figure 
5.5 (grey panel). For the content of thoughts, this resulted in: 1) a Past/Off Task/Others 
component, weighting on thinking about the past and about other people, while being off task; 
2) a Future/Self component, weighting on thinking about the future and on one’s self, and 3) a 
Positive/On Task component, weighting on having positively valenced thoughts, while being 
on task. For the form of thoughts, the analysis identified: 1) an Images component, weighting 
on thinking in images and also not thinking in words, 2) an Intrusive component, weighting 
on reporting one’s thoughts as being intrusive, and 3) a Vague component, weighting on 
having vague thoughts. These are very similar to the solutions produced in prior investigations 
using this approach (see Medea et al., 2016, Smallwood et al., 2016, for demonstration of 
similar solutions in three different samples of participants). For the purpose of our analysis, 
we projected these solutions back onto the trial level data: this way, aside for the raw scales 
for each question, every thought probe had six additional values, representing the weights of 
the six principal components (three for the content and three for the form of thoughts) found 
with the factor analysis. 
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5.3.3 Participants 
Forty-two participants (18-28 years, mean age 19.4; 8 males) completed Experiment 1; nine 
participants were removed from the analyses due to excessive amount of missing pupil data 
(as defined below in the pre-processing section) and one was removed as target accuracy was 
at chance; after filtering of participants, thirty-two participants (57 total sessions) were used in 
the analyses. Forty-two participants (18-39 years, mean age 21.5; 11 males) completed 
Experiment 2; five participants were removed from the analyses due to excessive amount of 
missing pupil data, one participant was removed due to abnormally slow reaction times; 
thirty-six participants (104 total sessions) were finally used in the analyses. 
 
5.3.4 Apparatus and Setup 
Pupil size was recorded using an EyeLink 1000 Desktop Mount (SR Research Ltd., 
Mississauga, ON, Canada), at a rate of 250hz, from the right eye only of participants. Pupil 
diameter was measured in arbitrary units as recorded by the eye-tracker. The study was 
conducted in a small, dark room with no windows, resulting in ambient light levels below 0.1 
cd/m2. Visual stimuli were presented on an 18-inch LCD monitor located 60 cm from the 
chinrest (with forehead support) that participants used, and the eye-tracker was placed right 
below the computer screen. Presentation of all stimuli was controlled with PsychoPy2 
v.1.81.03 together with the ioHub Python package (http://www.isolver-
solutions.com/iohubdocs/) to interface with the eye-tracker.  
 
5.3.5 Procedure 
Participants were provided an information sheet for the experiment at least 24 hours ahead of 
the testing day; on the day, participants were welcomed in the lab and signed a consent form. 
They were then introduced to the task paradigm and the eye-tracker setup, after which they 
completed a practice trial of the task, which included full instructions. Participants were 
instructed to respond as fast and accurately as possible to the targets; participants were also 
instructed on the definition of being on-task (e.g. being completely focused on the task, or 
having thoughts regarding the task), and being off-task (e.g. thinking about something 
completely unrelated, such as planning a future holiday). A randomized target order 9-point 
calibration routine was performed and a separate validation was performed using the EyeLink 
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1000 software. Once calibration was completed, the experiment began. Participants were 
asked to maintain fixation in the centre of the screen for the entire duration of the 
experiments, except when responding to the thought probes in Experiment 2. All investigation 
was conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki; the study 
and the process for gaining informed consent was approved by the University of York 
Department of Psychology’s Ethics Committee, and by the Ministry of Defence Research 
Ethics Committees.  
 
5.3.6 Pre-processing of Eye-tracking Data 
The following pre-processing steps were taken in order to remove possible artefacts before 
data analysis, for each session, for each participant. If pupil data was missing in time periods 
longer than 1 second, the trial was discarded, while it was linearly interpolated for periods 
shorter than 1 second. If more than 25% of the data was missing (e.g. for excessive blinking, 
drowsiness, falling asleep), the entire session was discarded and not used in subsequent 
analysis. Pupil data was z-scored and trials in which pupil measures had values larger than 3.5 
or smaller than -3.5 were discarded. Gaze fixation in the centre of the screen was monitored 
automatically, and if it diverged outside of a 88 pixel central boundary (approximately 2.7 
visual degrees given our setup), the trial was discarded. The pupil time series was also median 
filtered (order 5) to remove spikes, and low-pass filtered with a 10hz cut-off and then 
downsampled to 80ms (12.5hz). 
 
5.3.7 Analysis 
Pupil data was analysed using linear mixed models as implemented in R through the package 
lme4 (Bates et al., 2015). For both experiments we ran models to investigate how baseline 
pupil size predicted behaviour (target RTs), and for Experiment 2 we also ran models to 
investigate how pupil size predicted on task focus and mind wandering reports (PCA 
components) in the two task conditions. We selected a time window of interest comprising the 
non-target (NT) and fixation cross immediately preceding either a correctly reported target, in 
case of behaviour, or a thought probe, for the analysis of the self-reports. This resulted in an 
average time window of 3.5 seconds. In all our models the average pupil diameter in that time 
window, and task condition, were included as fixed effect predictors; on task reports, PCA 
components extracted from the mind wandering reports (Experiment 2), and reaction times 
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(Experiment 1 and 2; log-transformed in order to normalise their distribution) were the 
predicted variables in our models. Participants and sessions were modelled as random factors, 
in a nested fashion; sessions were also modelled as a fixed factor, in order to investigate 
possible learning effects. We then compared models that had task condition to a null model 
through a Likelihood Ratio Test, to see if it would improve the model’s fit. Next, we 
compared models that progressively included a session and a baseline pupil factor, to see if 
the additional predictors would improve model fit; If the additional factors improved model 
fit, we compared models that included the interactions between the predictors, to models only 
having the individual predictors but with no interaction. Finally, because stimulus-evoked 
pupil response (Beatty, 1982) has been previously shown to differentiate between on-task and 
off-task attentional states and accurate/inaccurate performance (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 
2011; Unsworth & Robison, 2016), we also looked at the amplitude of the pupil response 
(calculated as the difference between the peak response and the average pupil size during that 
time window) for the presentation of the critical NTs (immediately preceding a target or a 
thought probe), by including it as a fixed effect in place of the baseline pupil in a new set of 
analyses. Fixed effects on the predicted variables were plotted using the effects (Fox, 2003) 
and ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) R packages.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Task Condition Effects on Behaviour and Pupil Size (Experiment 1 & 2) 
We analysed participants’ accuracy and response time data for both of our studies using 
paired sample t-tests. We replicated the task-condition effects found in Konishi et al. (2015). 
Participants were both slower, and less accurate, to targets in the 1-back task relative to the 0-
back (Experiment 1 RTs:  t(35) = 10.00, p < .001, Experiment 1 accuracy:  t(35) = 3.93, p < 
.001; Experiment 2 RTs: t(31) = 7.99, p < .001, Experiment 2 accuracy: t(31) = 5.08, p<.001). 
In Experiment 2 we also replicate the effects of differential task focus for the two conditions 
(Konishi et al., 2015), so that participants reported to be more off task in the 0-back condition 
than in the 1-back (t(35)=4.80, p <. 001). Finally we found that average pupil diameter (PD) 
was larger throughout the 1-back task relative to the 0-back, in both studies (Experiment 1 
PD: t(35) = 2.02, p = .051; Experiment 2 PD:  t(31) = 3.03, p = .005). We also analysed the 
effect of task condition on the average pupil response (divided in 17, 80ms time bins) to the 
critical non-targets immediately preceding a target, which was also significant in both 
experiments (Experiment 1: t(16) = 11.27, p < .001; Experiment 2: t(16) = 11.32, p < .001). 
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All results are shown in Figure 5.1 (bottom panel); the pupil waveform to the critical NTs and 
fixations preceding a target is shown in Figure 5.2 for both experiments. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 - The pupil dynamics evoked by the NT and fixation cross stimuli preceding a target in the 0-back and 
1-back conditions, in the two experiments. A baseline difference in pupil size is evident in the two conditions, in 
both experiments. A task-based modulation of the pupillary light reflex constriction (similarly shown before by 
Steinhauer, Condray, & Kasparek, 2000; and in the general context of arousal by Bitsios, Szabadi, & Bradshaw, 
1996, 2004) is also evident in the NTs. X-axis represents time (in seconds) since onset of the NT, showing the 
window of ~3.5 seconds used in our analyses. Error bars towards the tail of the stimuli are larger due to the 
presentation time jittering used. The Y-axis represents z-scored pupil size. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. In both studies, a larger pupil baseline is present in the 1-back than in the 0-back condition. 
 
5.4.2 Effects of Condition, Session, and Pupil Size on Target Reaction Times 
(Experiments 1 & 2) 
Task condition significantly predicted RTs in both Experiment 1 (χ2(1) = 258.15, p < .0001) 
and Experiment 2 (χ2(1) = 322.17, p < .0001), with longer RT in the 1-back condition. Adding 
the session factor to the model significantly improved the fit in both Experiment 1 (χ2 (1) = 
7.15, p = .007) and Experiment 2 (χ2(1) = 15.56, p < .0001), with later sessions  predicting 
faster RTs. Adding the baseline pupil factor also significantly improved the fit of the model in 
both Experiment 1 (χ2 (1) = 6.69, p = .009) and Experiment 2 (χ2 (1) = 22.01, p < .0001), with 
larger pupils predicting slower RTs. In both datasets, the best fitting models (in terms of lower 
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AIC, BIC, and degrees of freedom) contained individual fixed effects of condition, session, 
and baseline pupil. We also checked if the evoked pupil response to the critical NTs could 
predict subsequent performance: adding the stimulus-evoked pupil response also significantly 
improved model fit in both datasets, compared to models comprising of task condition and 
session as fixed effects: Experiment 1 (χ2 (1) = 12.71, p = .0003), Experiment 2 (χ2 (1) = 
36.91, p < .0001), with a larger evoked response predicting slower RTs. No interactions 
between the factors were significant. Finally, we checked if baseline pupil and task-evoked 
response (as dependent variables) were related to target accuracy, using repeated measures 
ANOVA, with condition and session as additional independent variables. A main effect of 
accuracy (F (1, 29) = 6.17, p = .019) indicated that baseline pupil was higher prior to incorrect 
responses in Experiment 2, alongside the known effect of condition (F (1,29) = 7.86, p = 
.009); no effect of session or interaction effects were found, no effects were found for task-
evoked response, and no significant effects were found in Experiment 1, although it is likely 
that low power in these last analyses had an impact, given the few mistakes done by 
participants in Experiment 1: Experiment 1 had a total of 50 mistakes (6 in 0-back, 44 in 1-
back) on 1998 total targets, while Experiment 2 had 128 mistakes (27 in 0-back, 101 in 1-
back) on 3095 total targets. 
These analyses therefore show that slower and inaccurate responding was preceded by larger 
pupils in both the 0-back and the 1-back task, and that RTs became faster across sessions. The 
relation between baseline pupil size and accuracy is shown in Figure 5.3. All other results are 
shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.3 - The relation between baseline pupil size (y-axis, shown in the raw Eyelink 1000 values) and target 
accuracy in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Large baseline pupils prior to mistake in 
a similar task had been previously observed in Smallwood et al. (2011). 
 
5.4.3 Effects of Condition, Session, and Pupil Size on Reports of Task Focus 
(Experiment 2) 
Our next analysis examined the relation between baseline pupil size and the response to the 
task focus questions. Task condition significantly predicted task focus in Experiment 2 (χ2 (1) 
= 44.38, p < .0001), as participants reported being more on task in the 1-back condition. 
Adding a session factor to this model seemed to have a very weak, but non-significant effect 
in improving model fit (χ2 (1) = 3.28, p = 0.07), with later sessions predicting lower task 
focus. Adding baseline pupils to this model significantly improved the fit (χ2 (1) = 22.06, p < 
.0001), with larger baseline pupils predicting more on task focus reports. We then tested for 
interaction factors between the three fixed effects. Adding an interaction factor between task 
condition and baseline pupil slightly improved model fit, nearing significance (χ2 (1) = 3.04, p 
= .081). To understand this trend we compared the effect of the pupil signal in each task 
separately. This subsequent analysis confirmed differences in pupil size for reports of task 
focus exist in the 0-back task (χ2 (1) = 21.59, p < .0001), that were not clear in the 1-back task 
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(χ2 (1) = 2.02, p = .155). All other interactions did not improve model fit. Similarly to what 
done for the RTs analyses, we also checked if the evoked pupil response could predict 
subsequent report of task focus, but found no evidence for this. All results are shown in Figure 
5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 - Illustrated on white background are the main effects of task condition and baseline pupil size on 
reaction times (log-transformed) and on-task reports. Larger pupils, and task condition, predict slower reaction 
times in both of our studies (top two panels). Additionally, larger pupils predict reports of being on-task in the 0-
back condition (bottom right panel). Grey panel shows task learning effects: over successive days, participants’ 
RTs become faster for both conditions, in both studies. 
 
5.4.4 Effects of Condition, Session, and Baseline Pupil Size on Experience Sampling 
Reports (Experiment 2) 
Having demonstrated a relationship between the pupil signal and the degree of task focus, we 
next examined how this related to the different types of mind-wandering as described by the 
decomposition analysis. Task condition significantly predicted self-reports regarding the Off 
task/Past (χ2 (1) = 7.04, p = .007), Future/Self (χ2 (1) = 12.52, p < .001), Images (χ2 (1) = 
25.97, p < .0001), Positive/On Task (χ2 (1) = 4.05, p = .044), and Intrusive (χ2 (1) = 4.82, p = 
.028) components: in the 0-back condition, compared to the 1-back, participants reported 
being more off task and thinking more about the past, thinking more about the future, thinking 
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more in images than in words, and described having more intrusive thoughts. Adding a 
session factor only improved fit for the Future/Self component (χ2(1) = 11.75, p = <.001), 
with reports of thoughts related to the Future and the Self increasing across sessions: the mean 
value for the Future/Self component in session 1 was -0.08, rising to 0.29 in session 6 (sess. 2 
= -0.03; sess. 3 = -0.10; sess. 4 = 0.12; sess. 5 = 0.14). Adding baseline pupils to the model 
only improved fit for the Past/Off task (χ2(1) = 8.17, p = .004) and Intrusive component (χ2(1) 
= 15.94, p < .0001). There were no interactions between task condition and baseline pupils for 
any of the PCA components. All results are shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 - Grey panel (right) illustrates the PCA decomposition of the thought probes in the 6 components of 
thought, divided by content and form. Numerical values represent the weights of each individual scale for each 
principal component. In the white panel are illustrated the main effects of task condition and baseline pupil size on 
the 6 components of thought. Task condition predicts reports for 4 components: in the 0-back condition, 
participants report being more off task, having more thoughts about the past (P), the future (F), more intrusive 
thoughts (IN), and thinking more in images than in words (I/W). Additionally, smaller pupils predicted more 
reports of off task and past thoughts (P), and of intrusive thoughts (IN). 
 
Analysing the components obtained from the PCA controls for the patterns of covariance in 
the participants’ responses, allowing us to explore our data with the minimum number of 
analyses. Our next analysis explored the relationship between pupil diameter and each 
individual question. This analysis revealed that task condition was a significant predictor for 
the following scales, so that the in the 0-back task, thoughts about the Past (χ2 (1) = 10.04, p = 
.001), Future (χ2 (1) = 5.43, p = .019), Self (χ2 (1) = 18.13, p = <.001) were more frequent, 
that thoughts had a more Intrusive quality (χ2 (1) = 7.81, p = .005), and were more often in 
103 
 
the form of Images (χ2 (1) = 14.64, p = <.001); the 0-back task also predicted less thoughts in 
the form of Words (χ2 (1) = 22.98, p = <.001). Adding a session factor only improved model 
fit for the Past (χ2 (1) = 5.07, p = .024), Future (χ2 (1) = 10.88, p = <.001), and Images (χ2 (1) 
= 6.12, p = .013), with these types of reports increasing across sessions. On the other hand, 
adding a baseline pupil factor only improved fit for the Past scale (compared with the model 
including both task condition and session, χ2 (1) = 8.82, p = .003), and Intrusive scale 
(compared with the model including task condition, χ2 (1) = 13.75, p = <.001). With the 
exception of the effects of the Emotion component, these patterns are broadly consistent with 
the results of the PCA analysis. Finally, we tested if the evoked pupil response (instead of the 
baseline pupil) could be a predictor for the mind wandering reports in all of our models, and 
whether between-subject effects of average pupil size predicted trait differences in mind 
wandering reports. In neither case did these analyses reveal significant effects. All results 
concerning the principal components and the individual scales are summarised in  
Table 5.2. 
 
Components condition +session +pupil 
Off Task/Past 0.007* 0.709 0.004* 
Future/Self <.001* <.001* 0.601 
Positive/On Task 0.044* 0.717 0.128 
Images<>Words <.0001* 0.103 0.724 
Vague 0.062 0.066 0.827 
Intrusiveness 0.028* 0.188 <.0001* 
    
Raw Scales condition +session +pupil 
Emotion 0.162 0.946 0.787 
Past 0.001* 0.024 0.003* 
Future 0.019* <.0001* 0.513 
Self <.0001* 0.094 0.664 
Other 0.541 0.839 0.251 
Images <.001* 0.013* 0.589 
Words <.0001* 0.329 0.105 
Vague 0.156 0.227 0.711 
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Intrusive 0.005* 0.489 <.001* 
 
Table 5.2 - The table illustrates the effects of the three fixed factors of interest in improving model fit. The number 
indicates the p-values resulted from likelihood testing models of increased complexity against each other. Asterisks 
highlight statistical significance on the likelihood tests, indicating that the additional fixed effect improved model 
fit. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
In two experiments we found evidence of larger pupil size predicting slow and inaccurate 
response times in a simple working memory task. A link between larger baseline pupils and 
slower or inaccurate responding has been observed before in different paradigms, such as 
Unsworth & Robison (2016) using a sustained attention task; Gilzenrat et al. (2010) in an 
oddball task;  Bradshaw (1968) in a reaction-time task; and Smallwood et al. (2011) in a 1-
back task similar to ours. Our data, therefore, adds to a growing body of evidence that 
unusually large pupils are a signature that external information is not being processed 
correctly. 
We also found evidence of a link between baseline pupil size and ongoing experiential states. 
In our data, off task states were associated with significantly smaller pupil size than was 
observed for on-task reports, replicating prior studies (Grandchamp et al., 2014; Mittner et al., 
2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016). Our analysis of the content of thoughts suggests that 
reduced pupil size is a marker for experiential states that are focused on the past, or that are 
particularly intrusive in nature. Prior studies using the same decomposition procedure have 
identified that past thoughts are most strongly linked to unhappiness (Ruby et al., 2013). A 
recent fMRI experiment (Smallwood et al., 2016a) demonstrated that past thoughts depended 
on coupling between the hippocampus and the lateral temporal lobe and decoupling between 
the medial prefrontal cortex and the occipital cortex, extending into the lingual gyrus. The 
coupling between the hippocampus and the posterior core of the DMN can plausibly be 
accounted for by a role of episodic memory in past related thought. More importantly, neural 
activation in the lingual gyrus is a correlate of large pupils (Kuchinsky et al., 2016; Murphy et 
al., 2014) so that it seems plausible that the observed association between small pupils and 
past thinking, as well as the decoupling between the mPFC and the lingual gyrus observed in 
prior studies, describes a pattern of increased perceptual decoupling that is important when we 
think about the past. This hypothesis could be tested by measuring external attention directly 
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using EEG and exploring if thinking about the past reduces the coupling between cortical 
activity and events in an ongoing task (see Baird et al., 2014). More generally, it seems 
possible that a combination of intrusive thoughts, as well as a tendency to focus on the past 
may constitute the experiential correlates of a state of rumination (Poerio et al., 2013; 
Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). In line with this view, past research has shown that when 
participants have smaller pupils, this exacerbates their perceptions of sadness when viewing 
other individuals, a process that is linked to activations in the anterior cingulate and anterior 
mid insula (Harrison, Singer, Rotshtein, Dolan, & Critchley, 2006). Moving forward, our 
study suggests that reductions in the size of pupils might be a useful marker in clinical 
research for the occurrence of internal thoughts that are related to the past and are intrusive in 
nature. 
Our data also highlights the theoretical value of taking into account both the content of 
experience and the context in which it occurs, in studies of mind-wandering (Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013). We found that pupil size was a more reliable predictor of attentional 
state in the context of the less demanding 0-back task than in the 1-back task. Although the 
interaction was not significant (p = .081), post–hoc analyses indicated a significant effect of 
pupil on cognition in the non-demanding 0-back task (p < .0001) and no evidence of an effect 
in the more complex 1-back task (p = .155). This may reflect the fact that in the less 
demanding condition of our experiment there is more freedom for attention to fluctuate for 
intrinsic reasons, and that these are being reflected in the pupil signal. Regardless of the 
specific interpretation, our data underscores the importance of characterising internal 
experience across multiple external conditions when attempting to explain their links to 
ongoing measures of physiology.  
We also observed that the pupil signal was sensitive to the content of experience, indicating 
the need to take it into account. Our findings suggest that a focus on the past, and experiences 
with an intrusive aspect during the mind-wandering state, are associated with periods when 
the size of pupils is minimal. Other aspects of mind-wandering such as focus on the future, by 
contrast, were not associated with fluctuations in pupil size, but were instead modulated by 
the level of external demands in the concurrent task and the amount of time on task. This 
shows that the pupil signal does not capture information on all aspects of the mind-wandering 
state, a complex heterogeneous state whose behaviour changes in a complex fashion across 
different task conditions. Given these data it seems that the studies of mind-wandering 
reviewed in the introduction might have failed to reveal a consistent association with the pupil 
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signal because they have routinely failed to account for this contextual and experiential 
complexity. Moving forward, it is a priority for studies to take account of different 
experimental and situational influences in their experimental design. 
In conclusion, our study suggests that there are two different physiological states that relate to 
reductions in the extent to which attention is devoted to the external environment, which 
differ on their psychological qualities. Assuming that spontaneous changes in baseline pupil 
size are related to intrinsic variation in arousal (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005), our data 
suggests that states of very high and very low arousal may induce situations when attention is 
not focused on external processing. However, our data suggests that these different states may 
not have identical psychological features. In both studies, slow responding to targets was 
preceded by unusually large pupils whereas smaller pupils were predictive of being off-task, 
and in particular of thoughts that were related to the past and that were intrusive in nature. In 
the future, it will be important to distinguish these two states of non-optimal external attention 
through the use of other metrics, such as their neural correlates or their associations to 
personality. More generally, as our study shows that different patterns of baseline pupil size 
discriminate between different attentional states, it underscores that it is dangerous to make 
generalisations directly from behaviour to experience because, at least in the context of our 
paradigm, these metrics do not agree (see Konishi & Smallwood, 2016) for a consideration of 
this issue). 
 
5.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
Our analysis used a short a priori defined window of ~3.5 seconds as determined by the 
jittering that our paradigm employed. This relatively short analysis window means our data is 
unable to determine whether there are longer-term trends in the pupil signal that may relate to 
ongoing experiential or behavioural states. Current accounts suggest that the pupil signal 
provides an indirect but reliable marker of activity in the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine 
system (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005) and that it characterizes the relative stability of ongoing 
cognitive and affective states, with smaller pupils indicating periods of greater stability 
(Hauser, Fiore, Moutoussis, & Dolan, 2016; Mittner, Hawkins, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2016b). 
With a longer analysis window it would be possible to explore whether the pupil signal can 
describe periods of experiential stability. This is an important question for future studies to 
address. Second, in our paradigm we did not ask participants to distinguish between 
intentional and unintentional mind wandering. These have been shown to be states that differ 
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in the context in which they arise, and in their relationship with task performance (Seli et al., 
2016; Seli et al., 2016b; Thomson et al., 2014); furthermore, a recent study has shown these 
states to have dissociable relations to cortical thickness and intrinsic functional connectivity 
(Golchert et al., 2016). It is thus possible that intentional and unintentional off-task thought 
would have differential pupillometry signatures. Third, a recent study (Van Den Brink et al., 
2016) has shown that the relation between pupillometric measures and attentional states can 
be modulated by time-on-task effects, which were not directly analysed in our study aside 
from the effect of multiple task sessions; future research could explore how time-on-task 
effects modulate more complex states such as the content of mind wandering. Fourth, recent 
work by Allen and colleagues (2016) has shown that aspects of the pupil signal are sensitive 
to meta-cognitive accuracy of perceptual judgements. The capacity to reflect on the contents 
of experience, known as meta-awareness, has been linked to the mind-wandering state 
(Schooler et al., 2011) and so it is possible that the pupil signal could shed light on our 
awareness of ongoing experience, perhaps highlighting how people catch their minds’ 
wandering. Finally, one motivation for conducting this experiment was to identify whether 
there was information about internal states that can be derived from the pupil signal, with the 
ultimate aim of inferring mental states in the absence of introspection. Our study demonstrates 
that response time markers of sub-optimal performance have a similar property under 
conditions in which participants are, and are not, required to introspect on the contents of 
experience; this provides some evidence that introspection might not disrupt all markers of 
external cognition; importantly, however, this is different to showing that introspection does 
not alter the nature of ongoing experience. To assess this question, it will be necessary to 
develop independent methods of assessing information processing linked to the pupil signal, 
such as can be achieved by using fMRI or EEG, and understand if these metrics change when 
participants are asked to introspect on their own experiences. 
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Chapter 6. The Role of Practice in Task-Positive 
and Task-Negative Default Mode Network Activity 
6.1 Introduction 
Phenomena like mind-wandering illustrate that the focus of human cognition seamlessly 
switches between the external environment and our stimulus independent, inner thoughts, 
depending on the context (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). While these transitions are frequent 
in everyday life, an adaptive cognitive system should be able to limit mind-wandering 
episodes when external demands are high, as in these situations MW leads to inaccurate 
performance (Kane & McVay, 2012; McKiernan, D’Angelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 2006; 
Teasdale et al., 1995), while allowing these off-task thoughts to arise in non-demanding 
situations (Kane et al., 2007; Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). 
This closely matches the pattern of activation of the Default Mode Network (DMN), a set of 
regions of the brain that are active when cognition is focused internally and at rest, and that 
reduce their activity when executive demands increase (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Mckiernan, 
Kaufman, Kucera-thompson, & Binder, 2003; Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle & Snyder, 2007); 
indeed, the DMN is now known to be directly implicated in mind-wandering and internal 
cognition (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, et al., 2010; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; 
Christoff et al., 2009; Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007; McGuire 
et al., 1996; McKiernan et al., 2006; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011).  
However, core areas of the DMN, specifically the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), have been found to be also coupled with task-positive 
behavior (Crittenden, Mitchell, & Duncan, 2015; Konishi et al., 2015; Simony et al., 2016), 
including tasks that require cognition to be stimulus-oriented, that is, focused on the external 
environment (Gilbert et al., 2005; Small et al., 2003); furthermore, although mind-wandering 
is known to normally hinder task performance (Mcvay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015; Unsworth & McMillan, 2012), activation in these areas has been associated 
with better performance in some tasks (Gilbert et al., 2005, 2006; Vatansever et al., 2015). 
The flexibility in task-positive and task-negative behaviour of the DMN was illustrated in a 
study (Konishi et al., 2015) that modulated the executive demands of a task. The task used in 
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Konishi et al. (2015) featured a 0-back and a 1-back condition. In the 1-back condition, 
participants saw several non-target stimuli (NTs) before a target was presented, requiring a 
response based on the previously seen NT; to make a correct response, participants had to 
correctly encode every NT, and then retrieve it when a target appeared. In the 0-back, 
response to the targets was based on the information they could see on the screen at the time 
of the response; furthermore, the targets were preceded by several non-targets (NTs), which, 
differently from the 1-back condition, were not needed to make a correct target response. 
Hence, for long periods of the 0-back, participants’ attention was free to drift off without this 
affecting their performance. Thus, using a hard, 1-back working memory task, and an easy 0-
back task, activity in the DMN was found both for non-demanding phases of the 0-back, in 
which participants were free to mind wander, and for demanding phases of the 1-back, in 
which participants had to respond to a target by retrieving a previously encoded non-target 
stimulus. In particular, an overlap in activity was found in PCC and mPFC for both of these 
phases, which encouraged cognitive processes to prioritise internal, over external, 
information.  
Moreover, the DMN is known to increase its activity as practice on a task increases, and this 
is closely related to an increase in mind-wandering (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, 
Grafton, & Macrae, 2007); this is likely a consequence of the fact that as a task is practiced, 
the processes needed to perform it are automatized and the demands on the executive system 
decrease (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Teasdale et al., 1995). 
With the present study we investigated the role of task practice on the recruitment of the 
DMN in both the context of stimulus-independency, and task-positive behaviour: by 
following the work of Mason et al., (2007), the aim of the present study was to observe how 
task practice affects DMN activation using a paradigm which has been previously shown to 
selectively varies participants’ executive demands, mind-wandering rates, and DMN 
recruitment (Konishi et al., 2015).  
The work by Mason and colleagues (2007) showed that repeated practice of classic working 
memory tasks with a high executive demand, leads to an increase in DMN activity and mind 
wandering reports. The task used in Konishi et al. (2015) instead recruited the DMN for 
specific instances of task-positive behaviour related to retrieval of internal information, along 
with instances of stimulus-independency; by making participants perform the task repeatedly 
over several days, it is possible to investigate what is the effect of practice on DMN activity in 
a task that specifically recruits the network for normal performance. One possibility is that the 
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differences in the two task conditions used in Konishi et al. (2015) would increase, leading to 
a further increase in DMN activity both for periods of 0-back NTs and also in the context of 
task-positive behaviour, for the 1-back targets. Alternatively, and similarly to the work of 
Mason et al. (2007), after participants become very familiar with the task, an increase in DMN 
activity could be seen in the easier of the two tasks. In Mason et al. (2007) the increase in 
DMN activity was seen in tasks that were practiced relative to new tasks; in the present study, 
it could be seen in the 0-back condition relative to the 1-back. Finally, there is the chance that 
no differences will be observed between the results of the present study and the one of 
Konishi et al. (2015).  
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
Thirteen healthy, right-handed participants (9 males, age range = 19-30 years, mean = 22.6 
years) completed the study and received a total payment of £25 for their participation; 
participants were recruited by advert from the Department of Psychology and the York 
Neuroimaging Centre at the University of York. All investigation was conducted according to 
the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and all participants provided written 
informed consent at least 24 hours prior to completing the experiment. The Ethics Committee 
of the York Neuroimaging Centre and the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee 
approved this study, including the process for gaining informed consent. 
 
6.2.2 Task Paradigm 
We used a variation of the 0-back/1-back task used in Konishi et al. (2015) and (Konishi, 
Brown, Battaglini, & Smallwood, 2017): the task features a 0-back and a 1-back working 
memory condition that continuously switch from one another throughout the experimental 
session (see Figure 5.1, top panel). The 1-back condition requires the participants’ constant 
external attention for optimal performance, while the 0-back condition allows long periods of 
task disengagement without affecting performance. Furthermore, the two conditions differ on 
the type of target response required: in the 0-back condition, participants choose a response 
(left or right) based on information present on the currently observed stimulus, while in the 1-
back condition participants base their response on the stimulus seen some seconds before. 
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Each condition block lasted on average 76 seconds (range = 42-165s) and the change of 
condition was signalled by a message (“SWITCH”) that remained on screen for ~3 seconds. 
On each trial, the number of non targets (NTs) preceding targets randomly varied between 2 
and 5; the number of targets per block varied from 3 to 5; the number of blocks per session 
was 2 for each condition; each session lasted 5 minutes and participants completed 5 sessions 
on each of the 3 days of testing. The average number of NTs for each session was 60 (~30 per 
condition), so that the total number of NTs analysed per participant was, on average ~900. 
The average number of targets for each session was 16 (avg. of 8 per condition), so that the 
total number of targets analysed per participants was, on average 240 (~120 per condition).  
Presentation rate of the stimuli was jittered in steps of 0.05 seconds in the following way: 
fixation crosses ranged from 1.8 to 2.2 seconds; non-targets ranged from 1.3 to 1.7 seconds; 
targets from 2.1 to 2.5 seconds and remained on the screen for the whole duration, regardless 
of a participant’s response; “switch” messages from 2.8 to 3.2 seconds. 
 
6.2.3 Behavioural Analyses 
The effects of task practice (sessions) and task condition on participants’ reaction times were 
investigated using linear mixed models (LMM) as implemented in R through the package 
lme4 (D. Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Reaction times were first log-
transformed in order to normalise their distribution, and were then fitted in a series of LMMs 
which sequentially included task condition, and task session as fixed effect predictors of RTs. 
Participants and sessions were also modelled as random factors in the LMMs, in a nested 
fashion. We then compared models that that had both, either one, or zero predictors, with a 
likelihood ratio test, to see if the additional predictors would improve the model’s fit. Fixed 
effects on the predicted variable were plotted using the effects (J. Fox, 2003) and ggplot2 
(Wickham, 2009) R packages. Only correct targets were taken into consideration in all of our 
RT analyses. Finally, we analysed the effects of task condition and session on response 
accuracy using repeated measures ANOVA. 
 
6.2.4 fMRI Data Acquisition 
Imaging data was acquired at the York Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) using an eight-channel 
phased-array head coil on a GE 3.0 Tesla Signa Excite HDx MRI scanner. Blood oxygen 
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level-dependent (BOLD) contrast images with fat saturation were acquired using a gradient 
single-shot echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following parameters: scan duration 
5 min and 10 seconds, repetition time (TR) 2000 ms, echo time (TE) 30ms, 155 volumes, flip 
angle 90°, matrix 64x64, field of view (FOV) 192mm, slice thickness 3mm, 36 slices with 
interleaved (bottom-up) acquisition order. The first 10 seconds were removed to allow 
magnetization equilibrium. 
The functional data were co-registered onto high-resolution structural images which were 
available as they had been previously acquired for each of the participants (TR 7.8 ms, TE 
minimum full, flip angle 20°, matrix size 256 x 256 x 176, voxel size 1.13 x 1.13 x 1 mm). To 
facilitate the co-registrations, a high-resolution T1-weighted in-plane anatomical image was 
also acquired for all participants, using a fluid attenuated inversion recovery (FLAIR). 
 
6.2.5 fMRI Pre-processing 
All fMRI pre-processing and analyses were performed using FSL (Jenkinson, Beckmann, 
Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012; Smith et al., 2004) version 5.0.8. We extracted the brain 
from the skull using the BET toolbox (Smith, 2002) for both the FLAIR and the structural T1-
weighted images, and these scans were registered to standard space using FLIRT (Jenkinson 
& Smith, 2001). The following pre-statistics processing was applied to the resting state data; 
motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002); slice-
timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase shifting; non-brain removal using 
BET; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm; grand-mean intensity 
normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; high pass temporal 
filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 100 s). 
 
6.2.6 First Level Analysis 
First and higher level analyses were conducted using the FSL FEAT toolbox (Smith et al., 
2004). For our first-level analysis we modelled the time-series data of each 5-minute session 
for each participant, using general linear modelling (GLM) and including previously 
estimated standard motion parameters: we used an event-related design that included the onset 
and duration of the four types of events of interest, i.e. targets and non-targets for both of our 
two task conditions. Six contrasts were defined: 0-back targets > 1-back targets and the 
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reverse; 0-back non-targets > 1-back non-targets and the reverse; 0-back non-targets & 1-back 
targets (internal attention) > 1-back non-targets & 0-back targets (external attention), and the 
reverse. Only correct targets were included in the analysis. 
 
6.2.7 Higher Order Analyses 
Our second-level, analysis combined each first-level analysis for each subject using FSL’s 
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME) with fixed-effects, in order to extract the average 
activation for each of our contrasts. In addition to this, one other “session” covariate was 
projected onto the second level: this consisted in a vector of standardised values for each of 
the participants’ fifteen sessions in order to observe any changes due to learning effects: for 
example, to observe the effect of task practice, a value of -1.56 was given for the 1st session, -
1.34 for the 2nd… until value 1.56 for the 15th and last session. 
Finally, the group-level analysis combined the second-level analyses for all participants using 
FLAME with mixed-effects, and one-sample t-tests were used to evaluate differences in our 
contrasts of interest. All analyses were cluster corrected using a z-statistic threshold of 2.3 and 
then corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05 FWE. We also performed the same 
analyses using a more stringent z-statistic threshold of 2.6 which yielded almost identical 
results, and so we here report the more conservative threshold; the only exception regards the 
analysis concerning the session effect, which we discuss further below. 
 
6.3 Results 
Our experimental objectives were twofold: 1) we aimed to replicate the findings of (Konishi 
et al., 2015), in which DMN activity was found for blocks of stimulus-independent cognition 
and also for task-positive behaviour; 2) considering that DMN activity increases across 
sessions for tasks with a high executive demand (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, 
& Macrae, 2007), we asked participants to return to the lab over multiple days in order to 
observe the effects of practice on the afore mentioned task (Konishi et al., 2015), in which 
DMN activity is present in relation to task-positive behaviour, along to instances of stimulus 
independency. Understanding if, and how, the role of the DMN changes with practice, might 
help to elucidate the multiple roles of this network, from stimulus-independent mind 
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wandering (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007), to  performing a 
simple 1-back working memory task (Konishi et al., 2015). 
 
6.3.1 Effects of Session and Condition on Accuracy 
Firstly, we analysed the effects of task condition and task session on target accuracy, using 
repeated measures ANOVA. These revealed a significant effect of condition on accuracy, 
with participants being less accurate in the 1-back condition relative to the 0-back (F (1, 12) = 
11.26, p = .008), and task session, (F (14, 153) = 1.95, p = .026), with accuracy improving 
across sessions. The interaction between the two within-subject variables was not significant 
(F (14, 153) = 0.656, p = .813). 
 
6.3.2 Effects of Session and Condition on Reaction Times 
Secondly, we used LMMs to analyse the effects of task practice and task condition on 
participants’ reaction times. Both task condition (χ2(1) = 335.27, p < .0001) and session (χ2(2) 
= 52.09, p < .0001) contributed to improving the model’s fit. As in (Konishi et al., 2017), 
participants’ RTs were faster in the easier 0-back task than in the 1-back, and also decreased 
throughout the sessions, with practice. The interaction between the two fixed effects was non-
significant (χ2(1) = 0.0024, p < .961). These analyses thus show an effect of learning through 
task practice across sessions, which does not seem to differ by condition; this replicates the 
findings of (Konishi et al., 2017). Results are shown in Figure 6.1 (panel C). 
 
6.3.3 Task Differences – Targets 
The two contrasts between periods of target response revealed different patterns of activations 
in the two conditions: targets in the 0-back condition (Figure 6.1, panel A) activated a set of 
core DMN regions more than targets in the 1-back condition, namely the mPFC, PCC, and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). The opposite contrast (1-back Targets > 0-back 
Targets; panel B) revealed three main clusters of activation comprising the salience network 
(Seeley et al., 2007), in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral insula, and one cluster in 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), all areas found in the same contrast in Konishi 
et al., (2015). Results are summarised in Table 6.1 and shown in Figure 6.1, together with the 
115 
 
results of Konishi et al. (2015) for the same contrast, and the effect of task condition and task 
session on RTs, mirroring the results of  (Konishi et al., 2017). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Illustrated are the differences in brain activity during target presentation for the two task conditions, 
and the effect of practice on RTs. A) Activity in PCC, mPFC and DMPFC for 0-back targets. B) 1-back targets 
recruit the salience network (ACC and bilateral insula), and right DLPFC. C) For both conditions, RTs become 
faster as participants practice the task over multiple sessions. D) Illustrated, in yellow, is the overlap between the 1-
back > 0-back target contrast of this study and Konishi et al. (2015), which is evident in the salience network and 
right DLPFC. 
 
6.3.4 Task Differences – Non Targets 
We identified a large set of regions that were significantly more active when participants 
attended to non-targets (NTs) in the 0-back condition compared to NTs in the 1-back 
condition. These included the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC), the two main hubs of the default mode network (DMN). These replicate the 
findings of Konishi et al., (2015) demonstrating that in the non-response period of this task 
the DMN is more active in the easier 0-back than more demanding 1 back. The opposite 
contrast (1-back NTs > 0-back NTs) yielded a cluster in the left intraparietal sulcus 
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(IPS)/superior parietal lobule (SPL), an area involved in goal-driven attention (Duncan, 2010; 
Luo et al., 2010; Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009) and part of the central executive network (Fox, 
Corbetta, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2006; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008). Results are 
summarised in Table 6.1 and shown in Figure 6.2, together with the results of Konishi et al. 
(2015) for the same contrast, and the dorsal attention network (Yeo et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 6.2 - Task-related differences in brain activity during presentation of non-targets. A) Stimulus-independent 
DMN activity during periods of 0-back NTs. B) 1-back NTs activity reveals a cluster in left IPS/SPL, part of the 
executive network. C) Overlap in PCC and mPFC (in yellow) during 0-back NTs between the present study and 
Konishi et al. (2015). D) The executive network/dorsal attention network as parcellated by Yeo et al. (2011). 
 
6.3.5 Internal > External Attention 
Periods of target response in the 0-back task, and the encoding of the non-targets in the 1-back 
task reflect situations when cognition is dependent on perceptual input, while the response 
periods in the 1-back task and the non-targets in the 0-back reflect periods of stimulus-
independency. Contrasting periods of the task that required the participants’ external attention 
produced a cluster in primary visual cortex (V1); conversely, the blocks of internal cognition 
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activated regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and right insula. Results are 
summarised in Table 6.1 and shown in Figure 6.3, next to the visual and the salience network, 
with which they overlap (Seeley et al., 2007; Yeo et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 6.3 - Brain activity during task periods that promoted internal (1-back targets and 0-back NTs) or external 
(0-back targets and 1-back NTs) attention. A) The “internal” contrast yields the salience network, showing activity 
in ACC and right insula. B) The external contrast results in a cluster in primary visual cortex. C) The salience 
network, as parcellated by Yeo et al. (2011). D) Visual network, as parcellated by Yeo et al. (2011). 
 
6.3.6 Session Effects on BOLD Response 
Finally, we examined if these effects were moderated by task practice, that is, the number of 
sessions completed by the participants. We found that task practice changed the pattern of 
activation for the Internal > External contrast: a cluster in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
resulted more active during the earlier task sessions, for the internal attention condition. The 
opposite effect, looking at clusters active during the later sessions, yielded no significant 
activations. Results are summarised in Table 6.1 and shown in Figure 6.4, next to the results 
of Konishi et al. (2015), showing overlap in the mPFC between the two maps. 
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Figure 6.4 - A) The task session analysis reveals one cluster in mPFC which is more active during the initial 
sessions for task periods of internal attention (1-back targets and 0-back NTs). B) Overlap shown in purple 
between activity in this mPFC cluster and in the conjuction analysis of Konishi et al. (2015), which looked at 
common activity in 1-back targets and 0-back NTs. C) The relationship between RTs and mPFC activity during 
target presentation for both conditions, shown across the three days of testing; mPFC activity is linearly related to 
faster RTs (aside from the last day of testing in the 1-back), discounting the possibility that, at least in this context, 
it relates to stimulus-independent phenomena such as mind wandering. 
 
Contrast Covariate Region 
Cluster 
Size 
(voxels) 
Peak 
Z 
MNI 
Coordinat
es (x,y,z) 
Cluster 
Centre 
of 
Gravity 
(x,y,z) 
P 
value 
NTs - 0-back > 1-
back - DMN 10335 4.29 
24  -40  -
18 -5  3  0 
<0.000
1 
NTs - 1-back > 0-
back - Left IPS 568 3.75 
-28  -66  
46 
-30  -59  
43 0.0049 
Targets - 0-back 
> 1-back 
- DMPFC 1516 4.4 -4  52  42 -9  40  44 
<0.000
1 
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Targets - 0-back 
> 1-back 
- mPFC 1431 3.84 6  46  -18 0  49  -9 
<0.000
1 
Targets - 0-back 
> 1-back 
- PCC 1187 4.3 -4  -60  10 
-2  -57  
18 
<0.000
1 
Targets - 1-back 
> 0-back 
- ACC 
686 3.69 
8  24  22 7  18  37 
0.0027 
Targets - 1-back 
> 0-back 
- 
Left 
Insula 
581 4.23 
-34  22  -6 -34  17  0 
0.0072 
Targets - 1-back 
> 0-back 
- 
Right 
Insula 
554 3.55 
34  18  2 35  18  -1 
0.0093 
Targets - 1-back 
> 0-back 
- 
Right 
DLPFC 441 4.06 38  32  24 39  28  24 0.0284 
Internal > 
External - ACC 792 3.67 6  28  22 5  25  28 0.0002 
Internal > 
External - 
Right 
Insula 450 3.81 42  18  -12 
38  17  -
10 0.0098 
External > 
Internal - V1 571 4.34 
-24  -88  
10 
-19  -88  
1 0.0024 
Internal > 
External Session mPFC 927 3.61 -2  52  -12 0  52  -8 0.0090 
 
Table 6.1 – Clusters showing significant activity for the left-column contrasts. The p-values represent the level of 
significance after correcting for the number of voxels in the brain 
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6.4 Discussion 
Our results show several similarities with those of Konishi et al. (2015): in this study, non-
targets stimuli in the 0-back condition, which don’t require participants’ attentional 
engagement, significantly activated the PCC and the mPFC more than the non-targets in the 
1-back condition, which in turn needed to be encoded by the participants in order to perform 
the task correctly. The relation between DMN activity and periods of stimulus-independency 
are well-known, and have been directly linked to mind-wandering episodes (Andrews-Hanna 
et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, presentation of targets in the 1-back condition, compared to the 0-back, was related to 
significant more activation of the ACC and bilateral insula, regions that activate for salient 
stimuli such as targets that prompt a behavioural response (Seeley et al., 2007), and right 
DLPFC, a region of the executive network often active during sustained attention and working 
memory (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003); this pattern mirrors the findings for the same contrast in 
Konishi et al. (2015). Furthermore, at the behavioural level participants RTs showed the same 
pattern as in Konishi et al. (2015) and (Konishi et al., 2017), with faster RTs in the 0-back 
condition compared to the 1-back, and with RTs decreasing over the multiple sessions, as 
participants practiced more and more the task.  
However, there were also important differences in the results of our two studies: activation of 
the mPFC and the PCC during target stimuli, which in Konishi et al. (2015) was found 
significantly more in the 1-back condition than in the 0-back, was shown to migrate to the 0-
back condition with task practice, in the present study. The present study expanded the 
research of Konishi et al. (2015) by increasing the amount of time and practice that 
participants had on the task; while in our 2015 study participants performed a single 
experimental session, in this study participants came on three different days to be tested, 
performing the task three times as much, on average. In order to test if the differences in our 
results could be due to the effects of increased task practice, we ran another set of analyses, 
this time including task session as a covariate: selective activation of the mPFC was found for 
stimulus-independent periods (0-back NTs and 1-back Targets) during early task sessions 
(Figure 6.4, panel A), but not when looking at the overall results. These results mirror what 
found in Konishi et al. (2015) with participants performing a single session of the task; 
moreover, activity in the mPFC found for 1-back targets in Konishi et al., (2015), seems to 
decrease, relative to the 0-back task, with increasing task practice in the present study. This 
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pattern of activity is consistent with the results of Mason et al., (2007), in which increased 
task practice was related to an increase of activity in the mPFC (and PCC) for the easier, 
practiced tasks, compared to novel tasks. In our study, participants did not encounter novel 
tasks, but instead practiced both an easy and a hard task; after these tasks became well 
practiced, activity in the DMN and especially the mPFC, was mainly present in the easier, 0-
back task, both for NTs and target stimuli. Moreover, activity of the mPFC seen during 
presentation of 0-back targets is more easily reconducible to task-positive behavior than mind 
wandering episodes, as it is directly related to faster RTs (Figure 6.4, panel C): notably, the 
relation between fast RTs and mPFC activity was not only true for the 0-back condition, but 
also for the 1-back with the exception of the third day of testing.  
Activation of these areas, and in particular of the mPFC, during presentation of targets in 
simple choice reaction tasks such as our 0-back condition, has been shown before in multiple 
studies (Burgess et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2005, 2006), and has also been linked to better 
performance in these tasks. To test if the relationship between mPFC activity and better 
performance was also true for the targets in our 0-back condition, we decided to run a series 
of LMMs with the BOLD response in our mPFC cluster as the predicted variable, the log-
transformed RTs as the main predictor, and with participants and sessions as nested random 
effects. Faster RTs were indeed predictive of higher mPFC activity either on their own (χ2(2) 
= 23.67, p < .0001) or taken into account together with task condition and task session (χ2(1) = 
3.87, p < .049), confirming the fact that activity in the mPFC during target presentation could 
not be indicative of poor performance; this also suggests that mPFC activity in this context 
was likely not linked to mind wandering episodes, which are known to hinder task 
performance. The relationship between mPFC activity, RTs, task condition and task sessions 
(show over the 3 testing days) is illustrated in Figure 6.4, panel C.  
One interpretation of these results is that throughout the three sessions, participants have 
learned to optimally encode the stimuli, while limiting their off-task thoughts to windows of 
time that wouldn’t hinder task performance, such as the 0-back NTs. Activity in the mPFC 
and PCC has been previously linked to improved performance in spatial tasks (Small et al., 
2003) and simple reaction tasks much similar to our 0-back condition (Gilbert et al., 2006; 
Vatansever et al., 2015). Furthermore, theoretical accounts of the mPFC have hypothesised it 
to have a key role in learning associations between different contexts and events (Euston, 
Gruber, & McNaughton, 2012); in modulating the relative influence between stimulus-
oriented and stimulus-independent thought (Burgess et al., 2007); in learning and predicting 
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the likely outcomes of negative and positive actions (Alexander & Brown, 2012); and in the 
control and timing of goal-directed actions in the context of simple reaction time tasks 
(Bekolay, Laubach, & Eliasmith, 2014). In particular the two latter accounts have gained 
traction by explaining mPFC activity with very low-level functions: both theorise the mPFC 
as a crucial area in controlling goal-directed actions and learning their relation with their 
consequences. Our results are consistent with these accounts: mPFC activity was increased 
during the first part of the experiment (Figure 6.4, panel C), where most of the learning likely 
took place, and was also related to improved performance, especially in our simple reaction 
task (0-back condition). Related to our design, it is possible that the mPFC supports learning 
of optimal task-behavior across a number of sessions, which would initially revolve around 
the more difficult 1-back task; once this is achieved and the process is automatised, optimal 1-
back task behavior could be supported mainly by the DLPFC, by maintaining working 
memory of the encoded NTs, and the salience network, by switching focus between external 
stimuli (a target triangle cue on the screen) and internal stimuli (“I remember that the triangle 
was on the right”).  
Accompanying these low-level accounts, a higher-level view of this pattern of results could 
see the mPFC and the DMN as areas crucial to conscious processing and decision-making: 
this would explain the activity in the initial sessions of the harder 1-back condition, when 
participants are still consciously focusing and learning to perform the task optimally, and the 
mPFC/DMN activity in the 0-back task across sessions, when participants are free to drift off 
to their own thoughts. Moreover, it is possible that once an easy task (such as the 0-back) is 
practiced enough, the DMN is able to support both mind wandering and task performance in 
an optimal manner, as it appears from our results. This is supported by a series of studies 
(Burgess et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2005, 2006) that found a relation between mPFC activity 
and improved performance in simple reaction time tasks similar to the 0-back used in the 
present study; the authors of these studies hypothesise that the mPFC regulates cognition 
between two modalities, an internal, stimulus-independent one, and an external, stimulus-
oriented one. Importantly, they argue (Gilbert, Dumontheil, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2007) 
that mPFC activity in low-demand situations, such as in a task like the 0-back, could represent 
not only a state of stimulus-independent thought (during the NTs), but also a state of 
watchfulness of the external environment (e.g. waiting for a target to appear); while the 
former state is the one usually attributed to mPFC and DMN activity, the latter explanation 
might also be justified by the consistent finding that mPFC activity is directly related to 
positive task performance (such as faster RTs), as it was in the present study.  
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Secondly, in this experiment we examined the pattern of brain activation during periods of 
stimulus-independency (SI) versus stimulus-dependency (SD), which were present 
differentially in the two task conditions: non-targets needed to be encoded in the 1-back (SD), 
but not in the 0-back condition (SI), as in the latter, task performance completely depended on 
encoding of the target stimuli (SD); finally, to respond correctly to targets in the 1-back 
condition, participants needed to retrieve internal information regarding the previously 
encoded set of non-targets, and thus 1-back targets likely reflect a state of stimulus-
independency relative to targets in the 0-back condition. During periods of stimulus-
dependency, in which participants’ attention was coupled with the external environment, we 
observed activation in a cluster in primary visual cortex. Conversely, during periods of 
stimulus-independency we observed significant more activation in areas of the ACC and right 
insula, regions comprising the salience network (Seeley et al., 2007).  
The pattern or relative deactivation of primary visual cortex during periods of SI, compared to 
periods of SD, might reflect a process of perceptual decoupling: this term refers to the 
disengagement of attention from the external environment during internal cognition, such as 
during mind wandering episodes (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008; 
Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). Perceptual decoupling is known to reduce the 
capacity to encode external stimuli at the behavioural level (Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & 
Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003), such as hindering comprehension 
of read material (Schooler et al., 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2008); moreover, 
perceptual decoupling during periods of mind wandering has been shown to reduce cortical 
processing of external events in EEG studies (Barron et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2010; 
Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008), and in at least one pupillometry study (Smallwood, Brown, 
et al., 2011). Previous research (Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013; 
Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012) has shown a role of the DMN in maintaining 
internal cognition insulated from external distractions, and the pattern of activation of V1 
found in this study likely reflects the same process at play, with decreasing activation of 
visual cortex during periods of stimulus-independency.  
Moreover, in the present study periods of stimulus-independency (the “internal” condition) 
showed activation in ACC and right insula, regions of the salience network (Seeley et al., 
2007); evidence from fMRI studies suggests that the primary role of the salience network 
involves integrating, detecting and  then selecting “the most relevant among internal and 
extra-personal stimuli, in order to guide behaviour” (Menon & Uddin, 2010). In this context, 
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the salience network has also been shown to be heavily implicated in regulating behaviour and 
cognitive control through its regulation of DMN activity (Bonnelle et al., 2012) and the 
switching between the DMN and the executive network (Goulden et al., 2014; Sridharan et 
al., 2008). As previously noted, the paradigm used in this study encourages frequent switching 
between a stimulus-independent and a stimulus-dependent modality of cognition. While in the 
1-back condition, participants have to continuously switch between perceiving and encoding 
newly encountered NTs (SD), and recalling their previous position to make a correct response 
when presented with a target stimulus (SI); in the 0-back condition, participants switch 
between responding to targets based on the stimulus they perceive (SD), while drifting off to 
their own self-generated thoughts during the presentation of the NTs, the encoding of which is 
not needed to perform the task. Fitting in this theoretical context, one interpretation for the 
pattern of activation of the salience network that is found in the Internal > External analysis 
(Figure 6.3, panel A), is that these areas are continuously selecting the most relevant stimulus 
for the individual, whilst regulating the switch between different networks needed to perform 
the task: this is evident in the 1-back condition, with the salience network active during 
presentation of target stimuli (Figure 6.1, panel B), helping to integrate between the perceived 
stimulus (two question marks plus the target shape in the middle: e.g. “where was the 
triangle?”) and the internally memorised NT (“the triangle was on the right”), which was in 
turn encoded through activity of the executive network (Figure 6.2, panel B). This activity of 
the salience network during 1-back targets is also accompanied by activity of the right 
DLPFC, which is known to be crucially involved in working memory tasks such as the 1-back 
(Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003).  
In conclusion, the present study’s replicates the main results of Konishi et al. (2015) and 
expands them to investigate the role of task practice in modulating DMN recruitment both for 
task-positive behaviour, and mind wandering. Periods of stimulus-independency in the 0-back 
task, when participants on-task focus is at its lowest, engaged the PCC and mPFC, core hubs 
of the DMN. In the other task condition, 1-back targets recruited the right DLPFC, a known 
working memory area which is thought to redirect and maintain attention to internal 
information, regardless of task difficulty (Barch et al., 1997; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003), and 
the salience network, both regions found in Konishi et al. (2015) for this contrast. 
Furthermore, the contrasts referring to periods of focused internal and external attention, 
revealed different patterns of activation, with the former engaging the salience network, and 
the latter engaging a confined cluster in primary visual cortex. Activity of the salience 
network, particularly engaged by 1-back targets (Figure 6.3, panel A), likely indicates a 
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process of recognising the relevant target (Menon & Uddin, 2010) and switching between 
different networks (e.g. DMN, executive network) needed to perform this task (Goulden et al., 
2014); activity in primary visual cortex, which is maximal for 0-back targets and is then 
reduced for the other task stimuli (Figure 6.3, panel B), might reflect a pattern of perceptual 
decoupling, in which external attention is reduced when focusing on internal stimuli (Schooler 
et al., 2011).  
Activity in the PCC and mPFC, which in Konishi et al. (2015) was present for both 1-back 
task-positive and 0-back stimulus-independent instances, was here observed throughout the 
testing sessions for the latter, but only at the outset of testing for the former. The role of the 
mPFC, and the DMN in general, for specific cognitive processes is still not pinpointed: while 
activity in these areas has been classically linked to periods of task-negative and stimulus-
independent mind wandering (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 
2009; Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maquet, et al., 2011), it has been shown that it can also be engaged by simple reaction time 
tasks (Gilbert et al., 2006; Vatansever et al., 2015), or more complex working memory tasks 
(Konishi et al., 2015; Spreng et al., 2014). One account of mPFC activity (Burgess et al., 
2007; Gilbert et al., 2007) sees this area as a gateway for internal and external cognition, 
regulating the focus on internal information while maintaining watchfulness of the external 
world, depending on the environment’s demands. Following the results presents in the 
literature and the ones of the present study, it is likely that the role of the mPFC adapts to 
repeated task practice: activity in this area was observed early on in the harder of two tasks 
(Figure 6.4, panel A), and then migrated to the easier 0-back condition across sessions, 
potentially reflecting a role of the mPFC in supporting the learning process of a task that relies 
on internal information, along with its acknowledged role both in simple reaction time tasks, 
and during stimulus independent mind wandering.  
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Chapter 7. General Discussion 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The field of mind wandering research has rapidly developed over the past two decades, in 
large part thanks to the advances in neuroimaging methodologies such as fMRI. Scientists 
have used many different experimental paradigms for the study of MW, but a standard 
paradigm has never emerged. Furthermore, certain neurophysiological correlates (NCs) of 
MW have been identified, but some are not exclusive to the MW phenomenon (e.g. the 
DMN), while there are mixed results for others (e.g. big or small pupils during MW episodes): 
for these reasons, we are still not yet able to identify a MW episode by only relying on its 
NCs, which should be the end goal of a covert, objective marker of the phenomenon. The 
research presented in these chapters aimed to develop a paradigm to study mind wandering, 
and then use it to investigate MW’s neural and pupillary correlates, in order to understand 
their potential as objective markers of this phenomenon.  
 
7.2 Developing a Mind Wandering Paradigm 
A dual-task paradigm (the 0-back/1-back) was developed by alternating an easy reaction-time 
task and a harder working-memory task, so as to modulate the participants’ internal 
experiences. In the three studies presented here, this paradigm effectively modulated both 
objective and subjective indicators of participants’ performance and task focus. First, by 
taking advantage of the known modulatory effect of task demands on MW frequency, our 
paradigm varied participants’ external attention, as MW reports increased in the 0-back 
condition, and decreased in the harder 1-back. Secondly, participants showed consistent 
behavioural differences in accuracy and RTs in the two tasks, resulting in improved 
performance in the easier 0-back task. These results agree with the context-regulation 
hypothesis idea that the consequences of mind wandering depend on the context in which it 
emerges: when arising in a non-demanding task, MW frequency did not appear to impact task 
performance. Finally, the pupillometric and neural measures acquired in the different studies 
also showed sensitivity to our manipulation, resulting in differences in baseline pupil size and 
brain activity patterns in the two task conditions: baseline pupil size was larger in the 1-back 
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task, signalling increased cognitive effort, while DMN activity was overall more pronounced 
in the easier 0-back task. 
The 0-back/1-back paradigm confirmed that it is possible to modulate MW occurrence, and 
potentially MW content, in an experimental setting by varying the executive demands of a 
task. Alternating a demanding and an easy task required participants to maintain focus during 
certain critical periods, and at the same time allowed them to drift off during other instances, 
without affecting task performance. This setup allows the experimenter to investigate the 
different physiological correlates of on-task and off-task states, and their behavioural 
consequences. 
 
7.3 A Marker for Mind Wandering 
This paradigm was then used to investigate the potential of pupillometric and fMRI measures 
as objective markers of mind wandering. Developing a covert marker of a subjective 
phenomenon such as MW would allow experimenters to measure aspects of this experience 
without relying on self-reports: these, while remaining the current golden standard for 
accessing individuals’ internal thoughts, suffer from several issues, the chief of which is their 
inherent subjectivity (Konishi & Smallwood, 2016). 
 
7.3.1 Baseline Pupil Size as a Marker of Mind Wandering 
 
The study presented in Chapter 5 explored the pupillary dynamics of MW and of external 
attention. The results of this study replicated findings in the literature that both small and large 
baseline pupil sizes are linked to states in which attention is not optimally tuned to the 
external environment (Aston-Jones et al., 1999; Mittner et al., 2014; Smallwood, Brown, et 
al., 2011; Unsworth & Robison, 2016; Van Den Brink et al., 2016); however, this study 
provided evidence that these states might have different qualities. While small pupil sizes 
were linked to self-reports of mind wandering, and in particular of intrusive thoughts and 
thoughts regarding the past, large pupils tracked task errors and slow RTs. Moreover, while 
some aspects of MW were sensitive to the pupil signal, such as intrusive and past thoughts, 
others were not, but instead were modulated by task context: for example, thoughts about the 
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future, or thoughts in the form of images, were more likely in the easier 0-back task. At the 
same time, task context also modulated the capacity of the pupil signal to predict self-reported 
task focus, as shown in the 0-back condition. 
These findings are particularly important in for the development of a marker of MW: while 
triangulating a psychological phenomenon such as MW is best achieved through a 
combination of self-reports, behavioural indices, and physiological measures (Konishi & 
Smallwood, 2016), this study shows that these might not always agree, and that generalisation 
from one measure to another should be made with caution. While MW has been linked to 
poor behavioural performance in previous studies, the results of Chapter 5 suggests that it is 
not advisable to use solely behavioural indices as markers of MW, as in our study these 
measures were differentially linked to the pupil signal: behavioural performance can be 
modulated by other types of attentional fluctuations such as external distractions, which have 
been shown to have a different pupil fingerprint than MW (Unsworth & Robison, 2016).  
The results of Chapter 5 agree with other recent findings (Mittner et al., 2014; Unsworth & 
Robison, 2016; Van Den Brink et al., 2016) that baseline pupil size can track a variety of off-
task states and lapses of attention. However, the findings presented in this chapter highlight 
the sensitivity of the pupil signal to task context, and the content of MW. This suggests the 
potential of using baseline pupil size as a marker of MW, but critically, only while taking into 
account its content, and the context in which it occurs. 
 
7.3.2 The Default Mode Network as a Marker of Mind Wandering 
 
The DMN has been notoriously linked to off-task and MW states (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, 
Huang, et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & 
Macrae, 2007), together with a range of other cognitive processes, from semantic memory 
(Binder & Desai, 2011) Using the 0-back/1-back paradigm, this study showed evidence that 
the DMN can be recruited by a simple working memory task, provided that it requires 
participants to process internal information. This result joins a recent series of studies (Spreng 
et al., 2014; Vatansever et al., 2015) showing that DMN activity is not only relegated to off-
task, stimulus-independent instances, but can actively contribute to task performance. 
Along with supporting a range of cognitive processes, DMN activity has been previously 
shown to increase as a task becomes well practiced, and that this is closely linked to an 
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increase in MW (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007). The study 
presented in Chapter 6 explored the effects of task practice on the DMN, by replicating the 
study of Chapter 4 and allowing participants to become very familiar with the 0-back/1-back 
paradigm over several testing sessions. While MW-related DMN activity did not appear to be 
influenced by task practice in our paradigm, task-positive mPFC activity was found in the 
harder 1-back condition in the initial sessions, similarly to what found in Chapter 4. 
Importantly, task-positive mPFC activity migrated to the easier 0-back condition across task 
sessions, reflecting a potential role of this area in supporting the initial phases of a task relying 
on internal information (1-back).  
The results from the studies presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 join other recent findings 
(Gilbert et al., 2006; Spreng et al., 2014; Vatansever et al., 2015) showing that the DMN can 
be actively recruited for task performance. In these studies, we did not acquire a direct 
measure of mind wandering to link this phenomenon to DMN activity: however, there is now 
increasing evidence that the DMN is not exclusively active during off-task states such as mind 
wandering, and furthermore, that it can directly contribute to on-task states. Aside from 
shifting our perception of this network, which for a long time was dubbed as “task-negative”, 
these findings underscore the caution needed, in thinking of using DMN activity as a marker 
for MW. Indeed, these studies suggest that a measure of DMN activity in isolation, without 
considering the task context in which it occurs, is not informative in discerning an 
individual’s state of on-task from a state of off-task. 
Overall, the results from the three empirical chapters presented in this thesis hint to the fact 
that, a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon such as mind wandering might be better 
understood when taking account both the content of the experience, as well as the context in 
which it occurs. Indeed, these have both shown that they can have an influence not only on 
MW itself, but on its behavioural and physiological indices as well.  
 
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
Developing a marker for a complex phenomenon such as mind wandering is not an easy feat. 
In the fMRI domain, the DMN was long considered an indicator of being off task, but recent 
findings show that is it not always the case. Pupillometry has been also used in a similar 
manner, but the findings presented in this thesis suggest that its predictive power is dependent 
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on the content of the experience, and the context in which it occurs. Finally, behavioural 
indices of attentional state, such as error rates and RTs, are not selective enough: a participant 
could make a slow response because he was lost in his own thoughts, because he was 
distracted by a loud noise, or even because he was being overly cautious.  
Ideally, a marker of mind wandering would have certain qualities. It would be covert and 
objective, that is, it would be measurable without relying on participants’ introspection. 
Importantly, a perfect marker would be both necessary and sufficient to describe the 
individual’s internal experience. Until this point, mind wandering research has identified 
correlates of MW which appear to be necessary, but not sufficient, for this phenomenon’s 
existence: a prime example is the DMN, which is routinely found to precede reports (Allen et 
al., 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011) of MW, but 
whose activity can also appear in other contexts. On the other hand, the field relies of self-
reports, which are sufficient for the researcher to describe an episode of MW, but not 
necessary for the phenomenon to exist. In future research, necessity and sufficiency for a 
marker might be achievable in specific contexts by combining self-reports and multiple 
physiological measures.  
The studies presented in this thesis analysed at most two of these potential markers at the time 
(one physiological, and one behavioural or self-reported measure), in order to understand 
participants’ attentional states. For example, the combination of brain activity and RTs can 
inform us that mPFC activity is linked to fast RTs and is thus likely not linked to a state of 
MW; alternatively, pupillometry and thought probes were combined to understand the link 
between baseline pupil size and the content of one’s thoughts. This approach might not be 
enough to develop a marker of MW which would be independent of a participant self-report. 
If that’s to be achieved, it is likely that a combination of at least two, if not three, 
physiological measures would be needed, together with behavioural and self-report measures 
for at least the first phase of development. A future study could, for example, combine fMRI 
with pupillometry using our paradigm: following the findings in the literature and the results 
presented in this thesis, it is conceivable that a pattern of DMN activity and abnormally small 
pupils preceding a slow response to a target, would be linked to a state of MW. This could be 
initially assessed with experience sampling, which remains the current golden standard to 
understand a participant’s inner world. By stacking different measures that all relate to MW 
(e.g. fMRI, self-reports, pupillometry, etc.), it is possible to identify the variance that is 
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common between them and thus increase the chances of triangulating the desired 
phenomenon. 
Context is also extremely important when inferring MW. For example, some measures are 
particularly suited for certain contexts: in a difficult task, behavioural indices might tell us 
something about participants’ attentional state; however, if the task is too easy, a participant 
might be able to perform perfectly without having to focus too hard. An experienced driver 
can drive home while lost in his own thoughts without making any mistake, while a novice 
would likely pay a distraction dearly: behavioural mistakes and attentional states would only 
be linked in the latter case, in this example. Conversely, pupillometry appears to be more 
informative of a participants’ fluctuations in attention during an easy task. Similarly to 
context, certain markers could be sensitive to the content of MW, as pupillometry appears to 
be. 
For these reasons, future research should first attempt to develop a marker of MW focusing on 
very specific contexts, and it should take into account the content of the experience. As recent 
studies have found, a marker of MW while driving (He, Becic, Lee & McCarley, 2011) can 
differ from a marker of MW while reading (Bixler & D'Mello, 2016; Faber, Bixler, & 
D’Mello, 2017); in the same way, a marker for creative, future-related MW might differ from 
one tracking ruminative thoughts. Generalisation to any context, and content, would be a 
successive step, potentially achievable after recognising the commonalities between the 
different markers.  
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, the research presented in this thesis developed a new task for the study of mind 
wandering. This paradigm was then used in a series of studies investigating the neural and 
pupillary correlates of this phenomenon, in order to understand their potential as objective 
markers. These studies show that the default mode network, the most consistent network 
associated with MW and off-task states, can be also recruited for task-relevant goals, and its 
activity is modulated by context and task-practice. Furthermore, this data shows that the pupil 
signal is able to track MW states, but that it is also highly sensitive to task-context and to the 
content of the thoughts experienced. These results suggest that it will be crucial, for future 
research aiming to develop an objective marker of a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon 
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such as mind wandering, to take into account the content of the experience, and the context in 
which it occurs.  
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